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ABSTRACT. The judiciary has long struggled to resolve conflicts of state search-and-seizure
law. The issue arises when a search occurs in one state, but the defendant is prosecuted in another.
For example, suppose a crime is committed in State A. In the course of investigating an entirely
different crime, State B officers perform a search and uncover evidence of the State A crime. The
search was unlawful and the evidence would be excluded under State B's constitution, but the
search was lawful under State A's constitution. Should the evidence be admitted because forum
law applies or excluded because the law of the situs of the search applies? What if State A officers
perform a search in State B for a case tried in State A?
State courts have developed at least five distinct approaches, each with its own assumptions
and methodology, to resolve these and other search-and-seizure conflicts of law. None is concep-
tually sound or pragmatically appealing. Courts should instead adopt a novel law-of-the-officer
approach. They should first interpret the state constitutions at issue to determine whether more
than one constitution reaches the facts of the case. If so, courts should apply the state law of the
police officer who performed the search. This two-step approach both capitalizes on the latest in-
sights from the conflict-of-laws literature and comports with the most common purposes behind
state exclusionary rules. Most importantly, it maximizes the deterrent value of exclusion by ensur-
ing predictability and simplicity.
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INTRODUCTION
It is almost trite to say that the exclusionary rule is controversial. The federal
rule, which allows courts to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, is fiercely
contested. Constitutional scholars continue to debate whether it is constitution-
ally mandated and, if so, under what theory. Others have focused on the rule's
normative appeal, arguing over whether it unfairly immunizes guilty criminals,2
has expressive importance, or even encourages judges to permit police perjury
or otherwise manipulate Fourth Amendment doctrine.4 And law-and-economics
scholars continue to wage an empirical war, employing statistics and behavioral
economic insights to show that the rule does or does not deter police miscon-
duct.5
1. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 785-800
(1994) (arguing that the exclusionary rule is neither textually nor historically consistent with
the Fourth Amendment); Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1885, 1887 (2014) (arguing that the exclusionary rule derives from the "historically evolving
interrelationship between the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses"); Potter
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1380-89, 1396-97
(1983) (discussing different theories as to the source of the exclusionary rule and arguing that
the rule is constitutionally mandated so long as other remedies are inadequate to ensure ad-
herence to the Fourth Amendment).
2. See, e.g., People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (denouncing the exclusionary rule for
allowing " [t]he criminal . . . to go free because the constable has blundered"), abrogated by
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961), as recognized in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 634
(1965).
3. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Everyman's Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule and the Rule of
Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule), 10 OHIo ST. J. CRM. L. 393,
397-98 (2013) (" [A]t bottom the rule is a fundamental expression of the 'rule of law' in the
criminal procedure context, or, in more colloquial terms, that 'there is a right way and a wrong
way' and 'the end does not justify the means."); Scott E. Sundby, Mapp v. Ohio's Unsung
Hero: The Suppression Hearing as Morality Play, 85 CHI.-ICENT L. REV. 255, 257 (2010) ("By
making suppression hearings necessary,... the exclusionary rule provide [s] a forum through
which the importance and substance of the Fourth Amendment is reaffirmed on a daily basis
in city and county courthouses across the nation.").
4. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 112-13 (2003)
(arguing that judges resolve close cases in favor of the police and look the other way even
when they strongly suspect that police commit perjury to avoid exclusion); Yale Kamisar, In
Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 131-34
(2003) (responding to Judge Calabresi's criticisms).
5. Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv.
363, 368 (summarizing the empirical debate).
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Yet despite the depth and quantity of this literature, one area of exclusionary
doctrine has been largely ignored: state exclusionary rules and, more particu-
larly, conflicts of state exclusionary rules. The Supreme Court incorporated the
Fourth Amendment against the states in 19496 and the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in 1961.' The Federal Constitution
therefore serves as a floor for the protection of the right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. But every state has a Fourth Amendment analogue
in its constitution and remains free to provide criminal defendants with search-
and-seizure rights above the federal floor.9 In fact, Justice William Brennan
called on state courts to do exactly that: " [S] tate courts cannot rest when they
have afforded their citizens the full protections of the Federal Constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often ex-
tending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
law."10
It did not take long for state courts to accept Justice Brennan's invitation."
One 1996 study found that nearly half of all states had established search-and-
seizure rights broader than those provided by the Federal Constitution.12 And
that study considered state constitutional interpretations that governed only a
sampling of common law-enforcement activities (e.g., home entries to effect fel-
ony arrests)." The number could be even higher if other search-and-seizure
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp, 367 U.S. at
655-
7. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. While the Mapp Court described the rule as "logically and constitu-
tionally necessary" to vindicate defendants' Fourth Amendment rights, id. at 655-56, subse-
quent Courts have held that the rule is nothing more than a "prudential doctrine." Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011). As a result, the current Court has recognized that the
rule is not mandatory, but rather one possible remedy among others for a Fourth Amendment
violation. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
8. Stephen E. Henderson, Learningfrom All Fifty States: How To Apply the Fourth Amendment and
Its State Analogs To Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L.
REV. 373, 393 & app. (20o6).
9. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) ("[T]he State [has the] power to impose
higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it
chooses to do so.").
10. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 491 (1977).
11. 1WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.12(a) (4th ed. 2016) (discussing the de-
velopment of state search-and-seizure law).
12. Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State Constitutional Law and
Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 93-95 (1996).
13. Id.
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doctrines are considered. A 20o6 study, for example, found that eleven states
reject the third-party doctrine, which provides that the Fourth Amendment does
not protect information provided to a third party, and ten others have indicated
in some way that they may reject it in the future.14
Similarly, states have adopted a variety of exclusionary rules. Few states have
unambiguously rejected any kind of state-law-based exclusionary rule." Far
more have recognized rules with various levels of protection ranging from those
that are coextensive with the federal rule to those that require exclusion even
when a federal exception would otherwise apply. For instance, as of 2007, the
highest courts of fourteen states had rejected the so-called "good faith" excep-
tion, which prohibits the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment if the police act in good-faith reliance on a search warrant
that later proves to be defective. 16 In sum, there is tremendous variation between
the states, not only in terms of the substantive search-and-seizure rights pro-
vided but also the exclusionary rules that remedy violations of those rights."
This checkered landscape produces an inevitable question: what law applies
when a search occurs in one state but the defendant is prosecuted in another?
Consider a stylized version of the facts in People v. Orlosky." A crime is commit-
ted in State A. Before an arrest is made, the defendant moves to State B. In the
course of investigating an entirely different crime, State B officers perform a
search and uncover evidence of the State A crime. The evidence is admissible
under State A's constitution, but inadmissible under State B's constitution.
Should the evidence be admitted in a proceeding in State A because forum law
applies, or excluded because the law of the situs of the search applies? What if
State A officers perform a search in State B for a case tried in State A?1 9 Or State
A and State B officers cooperate to perform a single search in State B for a case
14. Henderson, supra note 8, at 413.
15. As of 1996, only two states had unambiguously rejected a state-law exclusionary rule. Latzer,
supra note 12, at 119. The Maine Supreme Court rejected a state constitutional exclusionary
rule and the California Constitution was amended in 1982 to prohibit the exclusion of evi-
dence on state constitutional grounds. Id. at 119 & nn.232-33.
16. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984); Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incom-
pletely Theorized State Constitutional Decision-Making, 7 7 Miss. L.J. 265, 271-72 (2007).
17. See, e.g., John Bernard Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 73 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1218
(1985); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Methodology in Search and Seizure Cases, 77
MIss. L.J. 225, 226-30 (2007).
18. 115 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Ct. App. 1974); see also Helm v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1991)
(considering similar facts).
ig. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 834 P.2d loo8, loo9-lo (Or. 1992).
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tried in State A?20 When multiple jurisdictions are involved, courts must per-
form some conflict-of-laws analysis to determine which law governs the officers
who perform any relevant searches.2 1
Complicating matters further is the advent of new technologies, which will
only make multistate cases more prevalent. State lines are more porous and less
practically important than ever before. Not only do people and their possessions
regularly cross state lines physically,22 but, with the click of a mouse, one can
almost instantaneously send and store information across state lines with no
physical movement at all. Consider State v. Evers.23 A California officer investi-
gating online child pornography obtained a search warrant from a California
court that required America Online (AOL) -headquartered in Virginia- to turn
over the names and billing addresses of various users, including the defendant.
The California officer learned that the defendant resided in New Jersey and for-
warded the results of his investigation to New Jersey police, who promptly ob-
tained a search warrant for the defendant's residence and arrested him.24 Among
other evidentiary questions raised was whether the New Jersey Constitution
protected the account information obtained by the California officer pursuant to
a California warrant.2 5 The facts were different, but the question remained the
same: what law applies when a crime and a related search involve multiple juris-
dictions?
This Note analyzes current approaches to interstate search-and-seizure con-
flicts of law, concludes that none are satisfactory, and proposes a novel approach
consistent with both conflict-of-laws theory and the values underlying state ex-
clusionary rules. A few caveats are worth highlighting at the outset. First, this
Note considers only cases involving the exclusion of evidence as a result of a
search-and-seizure violation; it does not address cases involving custodial inter-
rogation26 and other doctrines with exclusionary remedies. Second, this analysis
20. See, e.g., State v. Briggs, 756 A.2d 731, 733 (R.I. 2000).
21. I use the terms "conflict of laws" and "choice of laws" interchangeably. While some argue that
one particular nomenclature is more accurate than the other, both describe the same field of
study. See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice ofLaw: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2448, 2449-54 (1999).
22. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CHOICE OF LAW 9-1o (2016).
23. 81 5 A.2d 4 3 2 (N.J. 2003).
24. Id. at 437-38.
25. Id. at 441; see also Susan W. Brenner, Law, Dissonance, and Remote Computer Searches, 14 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 43, 55-60, 63-80 (2012) (discussing how traditional conflict approaches might
be used to resolve cases involving remote computer searches).
26. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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is limited to cases involving officers from more than one state. Disputes arising
from federal-state cooperation may raise additional concerns not addressed here.
Part I provides a brief overview of the federal and state exclusionary rules.
While different constitutions may not mandate the exclusion of evidence, federal
and state exclusionary rules are constitutionally rooted.2 7 Because of that con-
nection, it does not make sense to apply one state's exclusionary rule to a viola-
tion of another state's constitution.
Part II briefly discusses the sparse constitutional constraints on a court's ap-
proach as well as the theoretical and judicial insights that have been gleaned over
the last century as the conflict-of-laws field has developed. State courts are gen-
erally free to engage in almost uninhibited common law making to devise their
own approaches to resolving these cases. The resulting experimentation with
different theories has revealed a few principles that should guide the develop-
ment of new theories. Perhaps most importantly, courts should adopt rules that
are sensitive to the substance and intended reach of the laws they seek to apply.
Part III assesses the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches. While
fact patterns like those discussed above have bedeviled courts for decades, there
has thus far been no clear consensus on the appropriate solution. Part III identi-
fies five distinct approaches to the problem. A handful of courts argue that the
exclusionary rule is a rule of evidence and, because rules of evidence are proce-
dural, forum law must apply. A few courts opt for universal application of either
forum or situs law. Some endorse one of the modern conflict-of-laws theories,
such as governmental interest analysis or the most-significant-relationship test.
Others perform a type of state-constitutional-law analysis and determine
whether, for instance, the forum state's constitution applies extraterritorially to
its officers when they perform searches in other states. And still others choose
the law that best serves the interests of deterrence, judicial integrity, and any of
the other purposes underlying a particular exclusionary rule.
Each of the extant approaches suffers from some degree of theoretical inco-
herence and, equally concerning, produces results at odds with the reasons the
exclusionary rule was created. Rather than persist in applying these flawed ap-
proaches, state courts should devise a conflict-of-laws framework that can con-
sistently and appropriately resolve interstate search-and-seizure conflicts of law.
27. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to all search-and-seizure exclusionary rules as constitution-
ally derived because most of the cases identified when performing the research for this Note
involved constitutionally derived rules. Some states, however, have statutory exclusionary
rules. See BARRYLATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINALJUSTICE 36-37 (2000) (listing
examples of statutory exclusionary rules). Whether a particular rule is constitutional or stat-
utory does not affect the analysis here. Either way, the rule should not be divorced from the
search-and-seizure right for which it is a remedy.
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Part IV proposes and defends one such framework. Courts should first per-
form a state-constitutional-law analysis to determine whether two laws apply. If
so, courts should apply the state law of the police officer who performed the
search. This approach is both conceptually sound from a conflict-of-laws per-
spective and consistent with the most commonly identified goals of state exclu-
sionary rules: deterring police misconduct, preserving judicial integrity, and
maintaining the public's trust in government.
I. EXCLUSIONARY DOCTRINE
Exclusionary doctrine is a prime example of the need to know the past to
understand the present. The federal exclusionary rule provides that evidence
may be inadmissible in a criminal trial if it is obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, which provides that " [t] he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated."28 Although it was originally conceived as a constitutionally
mandated remedy,29 the rule has since evolved into a prudential doctrine prem-
ised on the theory that exclusion deters police misconduct.o Following that
logic, the Court has carved out a number of exceptions to the rule when exclu-
sion is unlikely to further deterrence. Meanwhile, as the federal rule has evolved,
state constitutions have spawned their own exclusionary rules, and state courts
have developed exclusionary doctrines that overlap and diverge from the federal
doctrine.
This Part traces the development of the federal rule and its state-law coun-
terparts before providing a brief overview of current law. It does not take a side
in any of the enduring debates surrounding the rule's constitutionality or nor-
mative appeal. Instead, this Part describes the law as it stands to explain how
current doctrine should inform conflict analyses. Two observations are signifi-
cant. First, deterrence has played an outsized role in the development of state
and federal exclusionary doctrine. Second, while different exclusionary rules
may not be constitutionally mandated, they are constitutionally rooted. In other
words, they are tied to the particular constitutional provisions that they protect.
It would not make sense to employ an exclusionary rule derived from one con-
stitutional provision to remedy the violation of another constitution's analogue.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1372-80 (documenting the history of the federal exclusionary
rule).
30. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011) ("The rule's sole purpose, we have
repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.").
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The approach proposed in Part IV is faithful to these core features of exclusion-
ary doctrine.
A. The History of the Federal Exclusionary Rule
While the development of the exclusionary rule can be traced at least as far
back as the mid-188os," most commentators agree that the genesis of the mod-
ern rule was the Supreme Court's 1914 decision in Weeks v. United States.32 There,
the Court excluded evidence unlawfully obtained by federal officers." It rea-
soned that exclusion was "obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal sys-
tem with the enforcement of the laws" in order to give "force and effect" to the
Fourth Amendment.34 "To sanction such proceedings," the Court declared,
"would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance
of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against . . . unauthorized action.""
Yet as sweeping as this language seems, the exclusionary rule's application
was for years narrowly cabined to federal prosecutions. It was not until Wolf v.
Colorado3 6 in 1949 and, more importantly, Mapp v. Ohio" in 1961 that the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment and the federal exclusionary rule apply to all
prosecutions, state and federal. In Wolf, the Court incorporated the Fourth
Amendment against the states, but left the states free to devise and apply reme-
dies other than the exclusionary rule to vindicate defendants' Fourth Amend-
ment rights." The Court then eliminated state courts' remaining discretion in
Mapp.3 9 It held that the states were obligated to impose the same remedy-the
exclusionary rule - to state and federal prosecutions involving Fourth Amend-
ment violations. Just as the Fourth Amendment was incorporated against the
states, "it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doc-
31. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621-22, 638 (1886) (discussing the privacy protections
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and excluding business papers obtained by court order).
32. 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule as
a Constitutional Right, 10 OHIo ST. J. ClM. L. 357, 357 (2013); Re, supra note 1, at 1922.
33. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
34. Id. at 392.
3s. Id. at 394.
36. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37. 367 U.S. 643.
38. 338 U.S. at 28.
39. 367 U.S. at 654-55.
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trine - an essential part of the right to privacy - be also insisted upon as an es-
sential ingredient of the right."40 Indeed, because earlier Supreme Courts under-
stood the rule to be constitutionally mandated, its incorporation against the
states was virtually inevitable.
But this understanding of the exclusionary rule changed dramatically in
1974. In United States v. Calandra,41 the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary
rule was not a "personal constitutional right," but a mere "judicially created rem-
edy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its de-
terrent effect."42 With that decision, the federal rule was both downgraded from
a constitutional requirement and repositioned as a remedy applicable only when
justified by a single purpose: deterrence.4 3 The result is that while state44 and
federal courts are still required to consider the exclusionary rule in the case of a
Fourth Amendment violation, they are no longer required to apply it in every
case. Calandra empowered the Supreme Court to create exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule when its costs outweigh its potential to deter police misconduct.
According to the Court, the rule "is neither intended nor able to 'cure the inva-
sion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered."'4 5 Instead, it is a
prudential doctrine that applies only as a "last resort" when "'its remedial objec-
tives are thought most efficaciously served'- that is, 'where its deterrence bene-
fits outweigh [the] substantial social costs"' of excluding potentially probative
evidence.46 As will be discussed, this doctrinal shift was not without repercus-
sions.
40. Id. at 655-56; see also id. at 655 ("Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it
is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government.").
41. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
42. Id. at 348; see also Stewart, supra note 1, at 1390 (discussing Calandra).
43. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 1.1(f) ( 5 th ed. 2012) (discussing the impact of Calandra); see also Davis v. United States, 564
U.S. 229, 246 (2011) (" [W]e have said time and again that the sole purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement.").
44. Mapp's incorporation of the exclusionary rule against the states has not been overturned. See
367 U.S. at 655-
45. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540
(1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
46. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (20o6) (first quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348; and
then quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)); see also,
e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2o61 (2016) (outlining the history of the exclusionary rule
and noting that it was not until the twentieth century that the rule "became the principal
judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations"); Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (referring to
415
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B. The History of State Exclusionary Rules
As the Supreme Court cut back on the scope of individual rights and reme-
dies in the decades after the Warren Court, states increasingly developed their
own, more protective constitutional law.47 By 1986, Justice Brennan was able to
reflect on the trend and declare that the " [r] ediscovery by state supreme courts
of the broader protections afforded their own citizens by their state constitu-
tions ... is probably the most important development in constitutional jurispru-
dence in our time."4 8
This resurgence is particularly evident in state search-and-seizure law. 4 9 All
fifty states have some analogue to the Fourth Amendment that protects individ-
uals from unlawful searches.o Textually, the provisions run the gamut from
those that are nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment to those that differ dra-
matically." But the degree of textual similarity to the Federal Constitution has
not necessarily determined a particular analogue's interpretation. State constitu-
tional decisions vary widely, even for provisions that are textually identical to the
Fourth Amendment.5 2 Some courts engage in "lockstep" analysis, interpreting
their constitutions to provide no more or less protection than the Federal Con-
stitution. Others have taken a more activist approach." Consider the third-party
the exclusionary rule as a "prudential doctrine" and declaring that exclusion is "'not a personal
constitutional right,' nor is it designed to 'redress the injury' occasioned by an unconstitu-
tional search" (first quoting Scott, 524 U.S. at 363; and then quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 486));
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-40 (2009) (assuming that there was a Fourth
Amendment violation but nevertheless determining that the exclusionary rule, a "judicially
created rule . . . 'designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deter-
rent effect," did not apply (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348)).
47. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 11; Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional
Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 337-39 (2011).
48. John Christopher Anderson, The Mysterious Lockstep Doctrine and the Future offudicial Federal-
ism in Illinois, 44 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 965, 968 (2013) (citing NAT'L L.J. (SPECIAL SEC.), Sept. 29,
1986, at Si).
49. Blocher, supra note 47, at 338; Williams, supra note 17, at 226-29.
50. Henderson, supra note 8, at 393.
51. Compare ALASIcA CONST. art. I, § 14 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses and other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated'"), with Aluz. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.").
52. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 8, at 418-19 (explaining that while the text of Indiana's Fourth
Amendment analogue is "virtually identical" to the Fourth Amendment, the Indiana Supreme
Court has interpreted it to provide more robust protections than its federal counterpart).
s3. Blocher, supra note 47, at 338-39.
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doctrine, which under federal law leaves items like telephone records, bank rec-
ords, and trash without Fourth Amendment protection.54 Kentucky has inter-
preted its constitution to mirror the Fourth Amendment," but its neighbor, Il-
linois, has explicitly found that telephone records and bank records do enjoy
some protection under its constitution.5 6
Following the Supreme Court's lead, many states have also adopted a state-
based exclusionary rule to give effect to their Fourth Amendment analogues. 7
And like state interpretations of substantive search-and-seizure rights, state ex-
clusionary doctrines differ from the federal rule -both as to the purposes that
guide the application of their rules and as to how a particular purpose should be
effectuated. Most states have not questioned the Supreme Court's determination
that deterrence is the primary - if not exclusive - purpose of exclusionary doc-
trine.58 But some maintain that the exclusionary rule should also be applied to
ensure the integrity of the judiciary, to maintain the public's trust in government,
or to protect individuals' privacy.59 The difference can be consequential. Because
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that its exclusionary rule serves to de-
54. Henderson, supra note 8, at 373.
55. Id. at 410 n.155 (first citing Commonwealth v. Mobley, 16o S.W. 3d 783, 784 (Ky. 2005); and
then citing LaFollette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Ky. 1996)).
56. Id. at 398 n.123 (first citing People v. DeLaire, 61o N.E.2d 1277, 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); and
then citing People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
57. See Clancy, supra note 32, at 384 (listing examples of state exclusionary rules).
58. LATZER, supra note 27, at 34; see also State v. Boyd, 9 9 2 A.2d 10 7 1, io86 (Conn. 2010) (" [T]he
rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures .... Appli-
cation of the rule is thus appropriate in circumstances in which this purpose is likely to be
furthered." (quoting Payne v. Robinson, 54 1 A.2d 504 , So6 (Conn. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
898 (1988))); State v. Evers, 815 A.2d 432, 444 (N.J. 2003) (emphasizing deterrence as the
"prime purpose" behind the New Jersey exclusionary rule). But see State v. Davis, 834 P.2d
ioo8, 1012 (Or. 1992) (explaining that the Oregon exclusionary rule is not designed to deter
police misconduct).
59. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 262 P.3d ioo6, 1018 (Haw. 2011) (holding that the Hawaii exclusion-
ary rule is designed to maintain the integrity of the judiciary and protect individuals' privacy
as well as to deter police misconduct); Evers, 815 A.2d at 444 (explaining that exclusion may
be appropriate to avoid the appearance that "New Jersey public officers" can "profit[] from
their own wrongdoing").
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ter police misconduct and to vindicate individuals' privacy rights, it does not rec-
ognize a good-faith exception. 6 0 Thus, evidence obtained because the police re-
lied in good faith on a warrant lacking probable cause is inadmissible in court.6 1
Yet just across the border in Ohio, such evidence is admissible. The Ohio Su-
preme Court has interpreted its Fourth Amendment analogue to be coextensive
with the Federal Constitution and hence the state's exclusionary doctrine turns
entirely on whether exclusion will deter future police misconduct.62
Other states agree that deterrence is the primary goal of the exclusionary rule
but disagree about how that goal should be operationalized. The New York
Court of Appeals, for example, rejected the good-faith exception, finding that
exclusion of unlawful evidence, even if obtained in good faith, could deter police
misconduct: " [I f the People are permitted to use the seized evidence, the exclu-
sionary rule's purpose is completely frustrated, a premium is placed on the illegal
police action[,1 and a positive incentive is provided to others to engage in similar
lawless acts in the future."63 in contrast, Missouri, like Ohio, has interpreted its
analogue to be coextensive with the Federal Constitution and has therefore fully
adopted the Supreme Court's good-faith reasoning.64
Of course, this is just a sampling of the variations in state search-and-seizure
law. Other states have interpreted both their Fourth Amendment analogues and
their derivative exclusionary rules expansively.6 But while the multiplicity of
state analogues continues to produce interstate search-and-seizure conflicts, it is
significant that most of the analogues place particular weight on the deterrence
rationale.66
6o. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3 d 182, 188 (Pa. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Ed-
munds, 586 A.2d 887, 905-o6 (Pa. 1988)).
61. Id. at 188-89 (discussing Edmunds and stating that "Edmunds turned on a determination that,
under [the state's constitution], the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania serves other values be-
sides deterrence; it also vindicates an individual's right to privacy").
62. See State v. Hoffiman, 141 Ohio St. 3d 428, 2014 -Ohio- 4 7 9 5 , 25 N.E. 3d 993, at ¶¶ 11, 46 (2014).
63. People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 4 5 1, 458 (N.Y. 1985).
64. See State v. Johnson, 354 S.W.3 d 627, 632, 634 (Mo. 2011).
65. See, e.g., State v. Moats, 403 S.W. 3d 170, 187 n.8 (Tenn. 2013) ("Particularly in the area of
search and seizure law, we have often rejected the standards adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in favor of more protective doctrines, tests, and rules."), overruled on other
grounds by State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3 d 673 (Tenn. 2016); Friedman, supra note 16, at 271-
72 (listing states that have rejected the good-faith exception as a matter of state constitutional
law); Henderson, supra note 8, at 413 (stating that eleven states rejected the third-party doc-
trine as a matter of state constitutional law); Latzer, supra note 12, at 93-94 (listing states that
have interpreted their constitutions to provide greater protections than the Federal Constitu-
tion for eleven common law-enforcement activities).
66. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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C. The Connection Between a Constitutional Violation and the Exclusionary
Remedy
Despite their differences, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and
state-based exclusionary rules share one crucial feature: though they may not all
be constitutionally mandated, they are all constitutionally rooted. Consider the
federal rule. Some have argued that it is mandated so long as other Fourth
Amendment remedies are inadequate.67 Others maintain that it is mandated as
a result of the interaction between the Fourth Amendment and other constitu-
tional provisions, like the Due Process Clauses.68 And some, like the current Su-
preme Court, understand the exclusionary rule to be entirely prudential. But
even proponents of the prudential view have never suggested that the federal
rule is untethered to the Fourth Amendment. The Court, for example, has de-
scribed it as a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend-
ment rights generally through its deterrent effect."69 Indeed, modern doctrine
must understand the rule to be somehow derivative of the Constitution if only
to justify the rule's continued incorporation against the states.70 After Mapp, it is
taken for granted that the federal remedy follows the federal violation. No state
would ever hold that there was a federal violation but then apply its own state
rule to remedy that violation. Equally telling, federal courts do not apply the fed-
eral exclusionary rule to remedy state constitutional violations.
Similarly, no state has suggested that its exclusionary rule exists apart from
its Fourth Amendment analogue. States that have adopted their own exclusion-
ary rules agree that the rule is a remedy designed to safeguard defendants'
search-and-seizure rights, though they disagree as to its exact constitutional sta-
tus.72 For its part, the Supreme Court has given states a wide berth in developing
their own doctrine. "The States are not foreclosed," according to the Court,
"from using a ... balancing approach to delineate the scope of their own exclu-
sionary rules."" The people of a given state "could permissibly conclude that the
benefits of excluding relevant evidence of criminal activity do not outweigh the
67. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1.
68. See, e.g., Re, supra note 1.
69. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also Slobogin, supra note 5 (discussing
different justifications for the exclusionary rule).
70. Re, supra note 1, at 1935 & n.266.
71. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 174, 178 (2008).
72. See Clancy, supra note 32, at 383-88.
73. Californiav. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,45 (1988).
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costs when the police conduct at issue does not violate federal law."'74 Hence some
courts, like Idaho,7 maintain that their rules are constitutionally required. Oth-
ers, like Connecticut, 76 have implicitly or explicitly followed the Supreme Court's
logic and held that their constitutions do not always require the exclusion of un-
lawfully obtained evidence and hence their exclusionary rules are not constitu-
tionally mandated. Finally, some, like Utah," have never resolved the question
of whether their rules are constitutionally required.
Nevertheless, while the precise relationship may vary, every state's exclusion-
ary rule is tied to its constitution. This is clear from the various state court artic-
ulations of the remedy. Consider again the exclusionary rules applied in Penn-
sylvania and Ohio.7 ' Based on its interpretation of its own state constitution, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has established an exclusionary rule premised on
two purposes - deterring police misconduct and vindicating individuals' privacy
rights. In contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted its constitution to
provide for an exclusionary rule premised only on deterring police misconduct.
The two rules apply differently, as they do in the good-faith context, even when
the police misconduct at issue is the same.7 1 Such distinctions in how an exclu-
sionary rule is understood are only possible if each exclusionary rule is uniquely
derivative of the text the state court is interpreting. In other words, it is impos-
sible to apply an abstract exclusionary rule without first determining which con-
stitution is at play because that constitution provides the applicable exclusionary
rule.
This feature of state exclusionary rules has important consequences for con-
flict analyses. As discussed in Part III, courts frequently err either by ignoring
the fact that an exclusionary rule exists to protect an underlying constitutional
provision or by attempting to apply an exclusionary rule without first determin-
ing which state's constitution applies. Equally problematic, many courts have
adopted conflict rules that fail to deter police misconduct. The following Parts
74 Id.
75. See State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (Idaho 1992) (" [T]he exclusionary rule [i]s a consti-
tutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures."); see also Clancy, supra note 32,
at 386-88 (listing other states with constitutionally mandated exclusionary rules).
76. See State v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d 145, 151 (Conn. 2003) (explaining, in response to a motion to
suppress under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions, that "[a]pplication of the
exclusionary rule . .. is not automatic").
77. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 473 (Utah 1990) ("We ... say nothing about the nature of
the exclusionary rule (constitutional requirement versus judicial remedy) pursuant to article
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. We simply hold that it exists.").
78. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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demonstrate that these problems are significant and avoidable. But first, some
background on the constitutional limitations and theoretical insights that have
guided the development of the broader conflict-of-laws field is in order.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL GUIDEPOSTS FOR
CONFLICT-OF-LAWS ANALYSES
In an era when constitutional and statutory law increasingly limit judicial
discretion,o it may seem strange that state courts have been able to develop so
many approaches to resolving interstate search-and-seizure conflicts. As will be
shown in Part III, five distinct methods have emerged. Such diversity is not ab-
normal in the conflict-of-laws field, which remains one of the few areas where
judicial discretion is the rule rather than the exception. Congress and state legis-
latures have largely ignored the field, leaving the Supreme Court to articulate
standards based on constitutional text alone." And as currently interpreted, the
Federal Constitution provides only minimal constraints on judicial law making.
While some have advocated for greater attention to constitutional restrictions,82
modern Supreme Court interpretations have effectively left state courts free to
exclude or admit evidence based on any of the laws involved. It is not surprising,
then, that common law making, heavily influenced by academic scholarship, has
filled the void. The resulting history of conflict-of-laws theory and practice, from
the rise and fall of the First Restatement to the proliferation of modern theories,
offers important insights that should guide the development of new theories.
Most importantly, new theories should be sensitive to the purposes and intended
reach of the laws in dispute. This Part summarizes the sparse constitutional lim-
itations on a court's choice-of-law approach and outlines the field's theoretical
so. See generally GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
81. While Congress has the power to regulate conflicts of law by statute under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, it has declined to exercise the full extent of its power, legislating a mere five
times on narrow subjects not relevant here. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 7. Nor have the
states stepped in to fill the void. Only two states, Louisiana and Oregon, have enacted com-
prehensive choice-of-law legislation. Id. at 8. Others have enacted a few specific choice-of-law
provisions for distinct substantive areas (e.g., insurance and matrimonial property). But ulti-
mately it is still the case that "the great bulk of American conflicts law resides in the law re-
ports, not the statute books." Id.
82. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1963);
Michael H. Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law: Deference to State Courts Versus Federal
Responsibility, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 419, 429-36 (1960); John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the
State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173, 180-91 (1981); Douglas Lay-
cock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV 249 (1992); Roosevelt, supra note 21.
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and judicial history. As will be discussed, the solution presented in Part IV is
faithful to both the Constitution and conflict-of-laws theory.
A. Constitutional Limitations
Under current law, the Full Faith and Credit Clause" and the Due Process
ClauseS" are the primary constitutional constraints that govern conflicts of law.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague effectively collapsed the inquiries under both
clauses into a single test": " [F] or a State's substantive law to be selected in a
constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of
its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."8 6 The Hague Court applied
this standard by considering the number of contacts the forum state had with
that particular case, which involved an insurance dispute arising from a car acci-
dent in Wisconsin. For example, it noted that the insured decedent, Ralph
Hague, had worked in Minnesota and thus that Minnesota had an interest in his
welfare." And it determined that because the insurance company did business
in Minnesota, the state had an interest in regulating the company's Minnesota-
related insurance obligations. Finding that these contacts were sufficient, the
Court affirmed the application of forum law and ultimately established an en-
during doctrine marked by extreme deference to lower courts' choice-of-law de-
cisions."
The Court has strayed from this highly deferential position in strikingly few
cases." In the words of Justice Jackson, "it [is] difficult to point to any field in
which the Court has more completely demonstrated or more candidly confessed
the lack of guiding standards of a legal character than in trying to determine
83. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85. 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981); see SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 24-25; Erin O'Connor & Stephen
E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 347
(David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2014).
86. 449 U.S. at 313.
87. Id. at 314-15.
88. See KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAws 130-32 (2d ed. 2010).
89. Only one lower court decision has ever failed the Hague test for insufficient contacts, and there
the forum court applied Kansas law to a class action with almost no Kansas contacts at all.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). More recently the Court struck down a
decision that evinced a "policy of hostility" to another state, but the Court's primary concern
was the sovereign status of California, a party to the case. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 136 S.
Ct. 1277, 1279 (2016) (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955)).
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what choice of law is required by the Constitution." 0 Thus, "'it is frequently the
case' that 'a court can lawfully apply either the law of one State or the contrary
law of another."'"
Yet despite the laxity of current doctrine, most conflict scholars agree that
conflict theories should be sensitive to constitutionally derived federalism con-
cerns.92 Most relevant here, a state should not discriminate against another
state's law by favoring forum law. The Second Restatement provides that " [i] n
formulating rules of choice of law, a state should have regard for the needs and
policies of other states and of the community of states."" Put simply, courts
should avoid choosing forum law because it is forum law. Such forum bias is at
least in tension with the Full Faith and Credit Clause.94 And from a policy per-
spective, it destroys uniformity, encourages forum shopping, and aggravates in-
terstate tensions.9 5
The bottom line for interstate search-and-seizure cases is that states will al-
most always be doctrinally justified in applying either the law of the situs or the
law of the forum to a given dispute. The situs state will always have a satisfactory
contact either because the searching officer was from the situs state or because
go. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 16 (1945).
91. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. at 1285 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003)). Of
course, the Fourth Amendment is also at issue in search-and-seizure cases. But that provision
establishes no more demanding a standard for evaluating a state's choice of law. In California
v. Green, the Court rejected the argument that "whether or not a search is reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in which
the search occurs." 486 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1988).
92. Gene R. Shreve, Conflicts Law-State or Federal?, 68 IND. L.J. 907, 912 (1993) (noting that
scholars agree that modem theories should be "sensitive to the needs of interstate federalism
and international cooperation"); see also, e.g., Laycock, supra note 82, at 251, 259 (arguing that
the Constitution prohibits states from preferring local citizens or local law to foreign citizens
or foreign law); Roosevelt, supra note 21, at 2535-36 (arguing that the Constitution prohibits
courts from adopting conflict rules that privilege forum law); Joseph William Singer, Multi-
state justice: Better Law, Comity, and Fairness in the Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1923,
1956 (arguing that the comity norm justifies application of non-forum law).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 cmt. d (AM. LAw INST. 1971).
94. ROOSEVELT, supra note 88, at 140.
95. Id.; see also, e.g., Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271,
274 (1996) ("If we believe that results in conflicts cases should be rational, predictable, and
fair; if we believe that the sovereign interests accounting for forum and nonforum law alike
should be respected whenever possible; and if we believe that all jurisdictions within our sys-
tem of state and federal courts should strive for uniformity in choice of law in order to pro-
mote harmony between jurisdictions and discourage forum shopping; then it is possible to
understand the destructive effects of conflicts localism.").
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the search occurred in the situs state. And the situs state will always have a cor-
responding interest in either the conduct of its officers or the search procedures
used within its borders. The same will also be true of the forum state. Because
courts only have jurisdiction over criminal matters that occur within their bor-
ders or have effects within their borders,96 the forum state will always have a
sufficient contact and will always have an interest in the prosecution of crimes
committed within its borders. Even adding the prescription that courts should,
at least as a normative matter if not a constitutional matter, choose a nondiscrim-
inatory conflict rule, the restrictions on a court's choice of approach are minimal.
B. Theoretical Insights
The dearth of constitutional guideposts has given scholars and lower-court
judges considerable leeway to decide how conflicts of law should be resolved. In
the last century, there has been no shortage of theories designed to bring order
to the esoteric field," and current doctrine continues to bear the fingerprints of
the debates that have raged in the academy. Those debates shed light on the
complexities of current law and offer valuable insights that can inform new the-
ories.
Joseph Beale authored the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the earliest
conflict-of-laws approach still used today, in 1934.98 Premised on the principles
of territoriality and vested rights,99 Beale's theory sought to systematize the law
by creating rules that turned on where the last act necessary to create a cause of
action occurred.100 Because a state's law was understood to apply only to events
that occurred within its borders, that last act was where the parties' rights vested
and hence that state's law, according to Beale, should govern the case. 101 In torts
96. See Corr, supra note 17, at 1223 & n.31. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 11 (discussing the
complicated law of criminal jurisdiction); Terrence Berg, State Criminal jurisdiction in Cyber-
space: Is There a Sheriffon the Electronic Frontier?, 79 MICH. B.J. 659 (2000) (discussing crimi-
nal jurisdiction and cybercrimes).
97. SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 93 ("American conflicts law ... is one of the few branches of
American law that has been heavily influenced by academic writers.").
g8. Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone
Trigger, 95 IOWAL. REv. 1125, 1129 (2010).
99. SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 54.
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cases, for example, the crucial last act occurred in the place of injury, so the law
of the place of injury was the appropriate choice of law.102
While this approach briefly enjoyed widespread acceptance in the courts, it
ultimately failed the test of time. 10 While a handful of states still follow at least
some of the First Restatement's rules, most have rejected the approach.104 The
reason is twofold. First, Beale's understanding of law as inherently territorial was
increasingly questioned and ultimately rejected. 0 s Second, and more im-
portantly for purposes of this analysis, the First Restatement came to be judged
more and more on the basis of its practical results as its theoretical justification
lost favor.106 And those results, it turns out, were not satisfactory. A single factor
that often did not correspond with any relevant issue in the case took on over-
riding importance. Cases involving no contacts with a given state other than the
all-important territorial connection were subject to the most criticism for ap-
pearing arbitrary and therefore unjust. 07
Of course, any rules-based system is likely to appear unjust in some cases -
that is the price the legal system pays for predictability and consistency. While
some have maintained that rules are anathema to the just resolution of con-
flicts,os that position has generally become more nuanced over the years. Even
the fiercest critics of single-factor theories acknowledge that they can be appro-
priate when justified by the substance of the competing laws.o
For this reason, the First Restatement's reliance on rules was not its most
damning feature. The First Restatement seemed unjust because its rules could
102. Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan Jones, What a Third Restatement of Conflict ofLaws Can Do, 110
AJIL UNBOUND 139, 139 (2016).
103. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 60-61.
104. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years Afier Currie: An End and a
Beginning, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1882.
105. ROOSEVELT, supra note 88, at 6, 35.
1o6. Id.; SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 131-46.
107. SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 131-46.
108. See Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Realism and Revolution in Conflict of Laws: In with a Bang and
Out with a Whimper, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1919, 1925 (2015).
iog. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 98, at 1169 (acknowledging that single-factor theories
can be appropriate in certain situations where predictability and uniformity are particularly
important); see also Fassberg, supra note lo8, at 1927 (discussing DAVID F. CAVERS, THE
CHOICE OF LAw PROCESS 139 (1965), which proposed single-factor rules based on substantive
considerations to resolve conflict questions); Symeonides, supra note 104, at 1917 (supporting
a flexible rules-based approach to conflicts of law, but opposing "monolithic rules, based on
a single connecting factor chosen on metaphysical grounds").
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not be justified by the substance of the laws in dispute.`0 The key insight of
modern theorists was that law is a tool of state policy. Hence a state would not
want its law to apply if a state policy would not be advanced."' According to
modern theorists, the First Restatement erred by giving controlling weight not
to "economic and social objectives," but to "technical and arbitrary rules relating
to the place" of a particular event.112 This criticism eventually took hold in the
judiciary, which was increasingly unwilling to sacrifice state policy objectives on
the basis of a single territorial factor." To this day, the consensus view is that
conflict approaches should be sensitive to the substantive policies underlying any
potentially applicable laws.114
As the First Restatement faded from the limelight, conflict-of-laws scholars
began formulating a variety of "modern" theories that rejected unremitting ter-
ritorialism and instead privileged the policies behind state laws as well as factors
like the reasonable expectations of the parties." The capstone of the so-called
"choice-of-law revolution" was the publication of the Second Restatement,
which aggregated a number of modern approaches. The Restatement authors
instructed courts to apply, based on the consideration of a number of factors, the
law of the state with the "most significant relationship" to the dispute. 1 16
Though often criticized by scholars, the Second Restatement's approach now
dominates the courts. 1 7
This history yields important insights that can and should guide the devel-
opment of new approaches to conflict cases. In addition to demonstrating sensi-
tivity to federalism concerns, new theories should consider the purpose of the
laws they seek to apply." Ignoring the substance of the relevant laws risks the
same arbitrary results that heralded the downfall of the First Restatement.
11o. ROOSEVELT, supra note 88, at 31-33.
iii. Id.; Roosevelt, supra note 21, at 2461.
12. Ernest G. Lorenzen & Raymond J. Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83 U. PA.
L. REV. 555, 587 (1935).
113. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 102, at 140.
114. Shreve, supra note 92, at 912.
115. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 102, at 140.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 141. Note, however, that it is difficult to categorize judicial approaches because so many
courts combine elements of more than one modern theory. Symeonides, supra note 104, at
1887-89. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, for example, considered factors from at least three
different approaches in one conflict-of-laws case. Id. at 1888.
118. Shreve, supra note 92, at 912. Shreve also notes that scholars agree that conflict theories should
respect party expectations and avoid unfairly surprising the litigants. This is largely irrelevant
in the search-and-seizure context. Those concerned about party expectations usually focus on
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The most recent work in the conflict-of-laws field draws on this and other
lessons from the history of conflict-of-laws development. The Reporter for the
forthcoming Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Kermit Roosevelt III, has
argued that conflict-of-laws theories can and should be understood through the
lens of a two-step framework."' Because that model has gained widespread sup-
port among scholars and is anticipated to be the foundation for a forthcoming
Third Restatement,12 0 it provides the theoretical framework for the search-and-
seizure approach proposed in Part IV. Drawing on the work of Brainard Currie
and Larry Kramer, Roosevelt argues that courts resolving conflicts of law must
first consider the scope of the relevant laws, and second, determine which law
should be given priority.12 1
To determine the scope of the relevant laws, courts should simply use ordi-
nary legal analysis to determine whether the laws reach the facts of the contro-
versy.122 For example, if a state legislature has explicitly provided that its law
reaches a given controversy, then the controversy should be understood to fall
within the law's scope.123 The proposed Third Restatement explains that this
analysis involves "deciding to which people, in which places, under which cir-
cumstances, [the state laws] extend rights or obligations."124 If only one state's
contractual disputes and other areas where the parties are likely to have expectations about a
court's choice of law prior to the dispute. Shreve, supra note 95, at 286. They argue that a
conflicts theory should avoid applying an unfavorable law if a party "reasonably and to his
detriment relied on the application of favorable law." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (" [I]t would be unfair and improper to
hold a person liable under the local law of one state when he had justifiably molded his con-
duct to conform to the requirements of another state."). Defendants in search-and-seizure
cases are unlikely to have arranged their affairs such that one particular state's constitution
would inevitably protect them from police investigation. And even if a particular defendant
had taken steps to conceal evidence in this way, those actions are unlikely to be characterized
as "reasonable" or "justifiable."
rig. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 102, at 142-43 (discussing scholarly support for the two-step
process).
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 5, topic 1, intro. note (AM. LAWINST., Coun-
cil Draft No. 1, Sept. 12, 2017) [hereinafter CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT DRAFT].
121. ROOSEVELT, supra note 88, at 1-2.
122. Id. at 43-44; Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to
CAEA and Shady Grove, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2012); Roosevelt, supra note 21, at 2482-
88; Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of
Language, So NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1870-75 (2005) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Renvoi]; Roo-
sevelt & Jones, supra note 102, at 142-43.
123. Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 122, at 1872-73.
124. See CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 120, S 5.ol cmt. b.
427
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
law reaches the facts of the case, there is no conflict, so the analysis ends; the
only applicable law controls the case.
On the other hand, if there is a conflict, Roosevelt advises that courts should
proceed to the second step: assigning priority, based on forum law, to one of the
applicable laws.125 Different rules of priority are possible, but the Third Restate-
ment explains that priority rules should be informed by modern conflict-of-laws
thought. For example, they should "generally seek to provide sensible, rather
than arbitrary, answers to choice-of-law questions, so that states' policies are not
needlessly thwarted."1 2 6
In sum, the lack of constitutional or statutory constraints has made space for
considerations based on the traditional preoccupations of the common law: rea-
son, history, and experience.127 Insights from history and modern scholarship
provide a rubric for judging both current and proposed approaches. The discus-
sion that follows elaborates on the importance of performing the two-step anal-
ysis described above and uses that framework as the foundation for the novel
approach proposed in Part IV to resolve search-and-seizure conflicts of law.
III. EXISTING APPROACHES TO INTERSTATE SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE
CONFLICTS OF LAW
Given the lack of theoretical consensus in the broader conflict-of-laws field,
it is unsurprising that courts have adopted a variety of approaches to resolving
interstate search-and-seizure conflicts of law. This Part outlines and evaluates
current approaches. While they are not always distinct and independent,12 8 a few
archetypes are discernible. The first is the application of forum law based on the
notion that the exclusionary rule is procedural. Alternatively, some courts favor
the universal application of either situs or forum law. Others use multifactor tests
or perform a type of state-constitutional-law analysis. Finally, there is the ma-
125. See sources cited supra note 122.
126. See CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 120, S 5.ol cmt. d.
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws 5 5 cmt. b (AM. LAw INST. 1971) (" [A
state] derives [its conflicts] law from the same sources which are used for determining all its
law: from constitutions, treaties and statutes, from precedent, from considerations of ethical
and social need and of public policy in general, from analogy, and from other forms of legal
reasoning.").
128. For example, in People v. Orlosky, 115 Cal. Rptr. 598, 6oo-ol (Ct. App. 1974), the California
Court of Appeals formally applied a type of governmental interest analysis, a modem ap-
proach, but it characterized its "interests" solely by reference to the state's exclusionary-rule
purposes. I therefore consider it to be an example of the exclusionary-rule approach.
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jority approach: application of the forum state's (or some other state's) exclu-
sionary rule to determine which state's law would best serve the interests of de-
terrence and any other purposes underlying a particular state exclusionary rule.
A. Application of Forum Procedural Law
Since the days of the First Restatement, courts have adhered to a basic rule:
questions of procedure, as opposed to substance, should be resolved according
to forum law.129 Procedural issues, in contrast to those "concerned primarily with
the rights and liabilities of the parties," involve the "procedure by which contro-
versies are brought into [a state's] courts and by which the trial of these contro-
versies is conducted."1"0 And according to longstanding practice,"' the First Re-
statement,132 and the Second Restatement,' questions regarding the
admissibility of evidence are procedural. It follows, according to some courts,
that forum law should determine the admissibility of evidence alleged to have
been illegally seized.134 But despite its appealing simplicity, this approach ig-
nores the constitutional violation that underlies every case involving an exclu-
sionary rule and discounts the significant public policy goals served by different
exclusionary rules.
The reasoning of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Burge v. State1"s is
typical of this approach. At issue was the admission of evidence obtained by Ok-
lahoma and Texas law enforcement officers who searched the defendant's home
in Oldahoma after receiving permission from the defendant's wife. In Texas,
spouses could consent to such a search, but in Oldahoma, they could not. The
129. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 585 (AM. LAwINST. 1934); SYMEONIDE, supra
note 22, at 68-73.
130. SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 68-73. In a related context, Judge Posner described a "pure rule
of procedure" as being "concerned solely with accuracy and economy in litigation [that]
should therefore be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of the particular judicial sys-
tem." Id. at 73 (quoting Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Can., 965 F.2d 195, 199 ( 7th Cir. 1992)).
131. See, e.g., People v. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill.1971) ("Evidentiary questions are generally
governed by the laws of the forum."); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 409 (1930)
(declaring that a state "may prescribe the kind of remedies to be available in its courts and
dictate the practice and procedure to be followed in pursuing those remedies").
132. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 12, intro. note (AM. LAw INST. 1934).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 6, intro. note (AM. LAwINST. 1971).
134. See, e.g., Saiken, 275 N.E.2d at 385; Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969);
see also People v. DeMorrow, 320 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. 1974) ("Inasmuch as the question raised by
the defendant is one of evidence, the law of Illinois, the forum State, is applicable.").
135. 443 S.W.2d 720.
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court ruled that the evidence was admissible even though it was unlawfully ob-
tained under situs law because "the law of the forum (Texas in this case) governs
as to procedure and rules of evidence."1 3 6 The Court explained briefly: "[a]ny
other view would lead to endless perplexity.""'
To be sure, the Second Restatement classifies the "proper form of action, ser-
vice of process, pleading, rules of discovery, the admissibility of evidence, mode of
trial and execution and costs"' as procedural. And it makes sense that these
issues, including run-of-the-mill evidentiary questions, are governed by forum
law. The forum is "more concerned with how its judicial machinery functions
and how its court processes are administered than is any other state," and apply-
ing any other law would compromise the efficiency and convenience of trials
without "further[ing] [] the values that the application of another state's local
law is designed to promote."3 9
But characterizing the exclusionary rule as procedural ignores the connection
between a state's Fourth Amendment analogue and its exclusionary rule. Because
exclusionary rules remedy a violation of state law, any choice to apply a specific
exclusionary rule is also a choice about which state's Fourth Amendment ana-
logue should apply. And neither the First nor the Second Restatement suggests
that the right to be free from unreasonable searches is procedural. Whether that
right was violated bears no relationship to "judicial administration."140
Similar logic undergirds the consensus view that "remedial issues are so
bound up with substantive issues that they ought to be decided according to the
136. Id. at 723.
137. Id. Other courts have followed the same logic and characterized the exclusionary rule as a
procedural issue. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 134.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (emphasis
added).
139. Id.
140. Id.; see also Commonwealthv. Sanchez, 716 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Pa. 1998) (characterizing a search-
and-seizure conflict as "a strict constitutional law question involving the fundamental right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures" that "must be addressed under the principles
of conflicts between substantive laws"); LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 1-5(c) (arguing that Burge's
summary decision to classify the exclusionary rule as procedural "has been justly criticized for
its imprecision"); William H. Theis, Choice of Law and the Administration of the Exclusionary
Rule in Criminal Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 1043, 1060-61 (1977) (arguing thatBurge's focus on
the procedure-substance dichotomy "confuses" the issues involved in an interstate search-
and-seizure case); Note, Conflict of Laws - Criminal Procedure -Law of Forum Applies to Search
and Seizure in Accused's Out-of-State Residence, 23 VAND. L. REv. 425, 428 (1970) (arguing that
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same law that governs the substantive issues."14 1 just as questions related to the
measure, extent, or amount of damages in tort are treated as substantive,142 so
too should be questions of exclusion under state constitutional law. Treating the
question as procedural ignores the exclusionary rule's remedial purpose and ef-
fectively equates the underlying legality of a search with "judicial administra-
tion."143
Moreover, even if the underlying constitutional violation is ignored, courts
following Burge's logic are valorizing form over substance by treating as proce-
dural a rule that furthers important policy goals like deterrence. Scholars and
courts have long criticized unthinking invocations of the "substantive" and "pro-
cedural" labels without considering the purposes underlying the relevant
laws. 144 According to the Second Restatement, a court should only classify a law
as procedural if it is "convinced that the policy underlying the distinction be-
tween substance and procedure in choice-of-law dictates such result.1 45 While
the line between substance and procedure is far from clear, the Second Restate-
ment suggests that the procedural characterization is generally appropriate for
issues related to the administration of court processes. Courts should consider
whether "an effort to apply the rules of the judicial administration of another
state would impose an undue burden upon the forum," whether the parties are
likely to have relied on a particular law before entering into a legal transaction,
whether the choice of law is likely to affect the resolution of the case, and whether
"the precedents have tended consistently to classify [an] issue as 'procedural' or
141. Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7 th Cir. 1988) (citing ROBERT A.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAw § 126 (3d ed. 1977)); see also C. P. Jhong, Annotation, Con-
flict ofLaws as to Measure or Amount ofDamages in Death Actions, 9 2 A.L.R.2d 1180 § 2 (1963)
(explaining that "the theory that the measure, extent, or amount of damages for wrongful
death is a matter of 'procedure' or 'remedy,' as distinguished from the 'substance' of the right
to recovery ... ha[s] subsequently been disapproved").
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 171 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
143. Cf United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (considering the scope of
the federal Fourth Amendment and declaring that " [w]hether evidence obtained from re-
spondent's Mexican residences should be excluded at trial in the United States is a remedial
question separate from the existence vel non of the constitutional violation," which occurred
"solely in Mexico").
144. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) ("Except at the extremes, the terms
'substance' and 'procedure' precisely describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they
mean in a particular context is largely determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy
is drawn:") ; Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict ofLaws, 42 YALE
L.J. 333, 336-37 (1933).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 7 cmt. d (AM. LAWINST. 1971).
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'substantive. "'146 Where a law "goes beyond questions of trial administration
and is primarily designed to affect decision of a particular issue," the forum
should treat it as substantive.14 7 In particular, if a rule "singles out a relatively
narrow issue" and gives it "peculiar treatment," the rule is likely substantive.148
Presumably for these reasons, the Second Restatement has classified a num-
ber of evidentiary rules as substantive. One example is certain privileged com-
munications. Courts are generally instructed not to apply forum law indiscrimi-
nately, but to apply the substantive law of the case to determine whether to admit
privileged evidence. They are not simply to apply forum law in all cases.149 This
departure from the general rule that evidentiary questions should be governed
by forum law is likely because, unlike other evidentiary rules, privilege rules
"subordinate the goal of truth seeking to the broader societal interests of pro-
tecting certain relationships and encouraging socially desirable confidences."5 0
State exclusionary rules are at least as substantive as state privilege regimes.
Like privileges - and unlike rules of evidence that seek to ensure the accuracy of
relevant facts and the efficiency of trials"' - exclusionary rules implicate sub-
stantive policy concerns, specifically those surrounding the administration of the
criminal justice system. They exist, depending on the interpretation of a partic-
ular state's constitution, to deter police misconduct, to ensure the integrity of the
judiciary, and to maintain the public's trust in the judiciary.152 Unthinking ap-
plication of forum law brushes these constitutionally rooted rationales aside and
demotes the exclusionary rule to a mere principle of administration.
146. Id. § 122 cmt. a. For example, the Comment on section 133 of the Restatement provides that
the burden of persuasion should generally be considered procedural because, like other pro-
cedural rules, it is "concerned primarily with questions of trial administration" and it is un-
likely that the parties "at the time of planning their transaction ... gave thought to the manner
in which possible litigation arising out of the transaction would be conducted." Id. § 133 cmt.
b.
147. Id. § 133 cmt. b.
148. Id.
149. Id. § 139 cmt. d.
150. SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 71; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 138
cmts. a & c (AM. LAw INST. 1971) (explaining that evidentiary questions are "usually" consid-
ered procedural but noting a number of exceptions, including for evidence related to the
measure of damages, privileges, integrated contracts, and the statute of frauds).
151. Cf Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Can., 965 F.2d 195, 199 ( 7 th Cit. 1992) (noting that federal
courts should always apply federal procedural rules, but should apply the substantive law of
a state where appropriate; and defining procedural rules as "concerned solely with accuracy
and economy in litigation,' and substantive rules as "concerned with the channeling of behav-
ior outside the courtroom").
152. See generally supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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B. Territorialist Approaches
Other courts confronted with interstate search-and-seizure conflicts of law
have adopted essentially per se territorial rules in favor of either forum or situs
law. Both territorialist approaches are unsatisfactory. Because neither approach
considers the policies underlying the exclusionary rule, both frequently produce
arbitrary results that have little to do with the purposes of exclusionary doctrine.
For instance, in People v. Price,1 ss the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
admission of evidence obtained by Los Angeles officers, allegedly in contraven-
tion of situs law. The defendant argued that the police violated California law
when they used a trained dog at a Los Angeles airport to detect drugs in his lug-
gage.154 Instead of considering the applicability of situs law, the court simply
declared that the case "d[id] not involve a conflicts-of-law question."' The
court held that the dog's reactions were used to justify a subsequent search war-
rant issued by a New York court, and thus the case involved "a question of
whether or not the use of [a] dog is proscribed by either Federal or New York
law, constitutional or statutory."156 And because the defendant's rights had not
been violated under either federal or New York law, the evidence was admissi-
ble.1 17 Other courts have also fallen back on per se rules in favor of forum law,
though they have offered little explanation for their choice of approach."'
John Corr has offered the most sustained and thoughtful justification for
consistently applying one law with few exceptions, though he proposes applica-
tion of situs law. 5 9 The most important benefit of this approach, according to
153- 431 N.E.2d 267, 270 (N.Y. 1981).
154. Id. at 268.
155. Id. at 270.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 804 P.2d 196, 198 (Colo. App. 1990) (applying Colorado (forum)
constitutional law to a North Dakota search because the defendant "assert[ed] a [Colorado]
constitutional violation"); State v. Camargo, 498 A.2d 292 (N.H. 1985) (applying New
Hampshire (forum) law without explanation to a search performed in Massachusetts by Mas-
sachusetts officers); Ellis v. State, 364 S.W.2d 925, 928-29 (Tenn. 1963) (applying Tennessee
(forum) law to a Mississippi search based, in part, on dicta in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655,
657 (1961), which suggested that evidence resulting from a foreign search should be held in-
admissible if it was obtained in violation of the forum state's constitution); State v. Platt, 574
A.2d 789 (Vt. 1990) (applying Vermont (forum) constitutional law without explanation to a
search performed in Massachusetts by Massachusetts officers).
159. See Corr, supra note 17.
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Corr, is its ability to "bring a needed measure of predictability to police work."16 0
To be sure, bright-line rules promote predictability, which is particularly im-
portant, as will be discussed, when deterrence is the goal. 161
But the onslaught of scholarly and judicial criticism of the First Restatement
demonstrates that mechanically applying a territorialist rule will produce unsat-
isfactory results in some set of cases because the rule will privilege a factor that
is generally unrelated to the substance of the relevant laws. 162 Interstate search-
and-seizure cases are not immune to this criticism. It is not hard to imagine a
situation in which mechanical application of either situs or forum law would re-
sult in an arbitrary outcome. Consider a case in which situs officers, operating
within the situs state, discover evidence of a forum crime while independently
investigating a situs crime. Assume that the evidence was lawfully obtained un-
der situs law but unlawfully obtained under forum law and inadmissible under
the forum state's exclusionary rule. In that case, few would argue that unthinking
application of forum law and its exclusionary rule provides a satisfactory answer.
At least one key purpose of the forum state's exclusionary rule - deterrence -
would not be furthered: the foreign officers in this and similar future cases could
not be expected to know that forum law was involved, let alone what forum law
required. 163 Mechanical application of forum law would therefore needlessly sac-
rifice probative evidence and, by extension, the effective administration of the
forum state's criminal justice system with no hope of effectuating one of the ex-
clusionary rule's most important purposes. Nor is it immediately clear that other
state-articulated reasons would support application of forum law. It would be
hard to argue, for example, that a defendant's right to privacy mandates applica-
tion of forum law when the evidence was located in the situs state and discovered
during the investigation of a situs crime.
Moreover, the risk of arbitrary application does not run in one direction.
Though no court appears to have adopted a per se rule in favor of situs law, that
too could trigger unjust results. Consider a situation in which forum officers un-
wittingly follow a defendant into another state before performing a search of the
defendant's automobile. Mechanical application of situs law would require the
court to hold the forum officers accountable to situs law, even if they did not
know that they had crossed a state line. Again, neither deterrence nor a concern
160. Id. at 1234.
161. Id.; see also infra notes 240-257 and accompanying text (explaining that a rules-based approach
is more effective at promoting deterrence than a standards-based approach).
162. See supra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
163. See also Theis, supra note 140, at 1048-49 ("It would be unreasonable to require that state
officers know the rules of all fifty states . . . .More importantly, the officers might not be aware
of the foreign nature of their investigation at the time of the investigation and would be in a
poor position to apply foreign rules even if they knew the content of foreign law.").
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for the defendant's privacy rights supports this outcome. The forum officers
could not be expected to know and abide by situs law, and the defendant's right
to privacy should not justify application of situs law merely because he or she
changed locations while the police were in pursuit. It is unlikely that the defend-
ant's reasonable expectation of privacy changed the moment he or she crossed a
state line.
In fact, Corr, the primary defender of the situs-law approach, admits that
mechanical application of situs law will sometimes be inappropriate. He permits
exceptions when accompanied by a "coherent" explanation of "why the normal
rule of situs should not apply."164 For example, Corr argues that a court should
not apply situs law if forum police officers have manipulated their investigation
so that less defendant-protective law applies. He reasons that the police in that
hypothetical case are acting as "vigilantes with badges who seek to frustrate the
purpose behind their own state's exclusionary rules."165 Thus, in reality, his pre-
ferred approach is a presumption in favor of situs law that can be overcome based
on judicial discretion and an analysis of the purposes underlying a particular
state's exclusionary rule. This approach resembles the exclusionary-rule ap-
proach considered in Section III.E. It is enough to say here that without such
safety valves, this type of territorial-based rule is unsatisfactory because it yields
arbitrary results with no justification grounded in the substantive policies un-
derlying a state's exclusionary rule.
C. Multifactor Conflict-of-Laws Approaches
A few courts have taken the opposite approach. Rather than resort to a tra-
ditional territorial-based rule or the longstanding distinction between substance
and procedure, they have adopted one of the multifactor conflict-of-laws ap-
proaches that have arisen in the last century (or they have created a unique mul-
tifactor approach that draws on the factors used in more than one of the recently
developed approaches). These multifactor approaches, which generally reject
mechanical rules divorced from the "real reasons relevant to the functions of law
in our society,"166 include state-interest analysis, the better-law approach, and
164. Corr, supra note 17, at 1237-38 (" [A] familiar engine drives us toward developing such princi-
pled exceptions: the discretion of trial judges, respectful of the general applicability of situs
law and constrained by their obligation to write opinions explaining why, in unusual circum-
stances, situs law should not apply.").
165. Id. at 1238.
166. Robert A. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 10, 26
(1977).
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the center-of-gravity test. 16 7 Regardless of its exact form, each suffers from a
number of common problems as applied in the search-and-seizure context. Few
if any of the courts that take this approach perform what should be the first step
in any conflict-of-laws analysis: determining whether a particular search and sei-
zure was governed by two state constitutions. More importantly, none of these
approaches have been applied in ways that are sufficiently sensitive to the policies
underlying exclusionary doctrine. And most of these approaches suffer from
some degree of problematic forum bias.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in State v. Briggs1 68 is illustrative
of a multifactor approach. In Briggs, the court upheld the admissibility under
Rhode Island (forum) law of evidence seized in New Hampshire by New Hamp-
shire and Rhode Island officers. 169 The police searched the defendant's trash bag
after following the defendant's neighbor and watching him dispose of it. 170 Un-
der New Hampshire law, but not Rhode Island law, the defendant claimed he
had standing to challenge the search and that the prosecution carried a heavier
burden of proof to obtain admission.1 7 1 To resolve the dispute, the court declared
that Rhode Island had adopted the "interest-weighing approach" to resolving
conflicts of law. 172 The court then recited the factors identified in its conflict-of-
laws case law: "(1) [p]redictability of results[,] (2) [m]aintenance of interstate
and international order[,] (3) [slimplification of the judicial task[,] (4) ad-
vance[ment] of the forum's governmental interest[,] and (5) [aipplication of the
better rule of law."1 7 1 In this case, the court held that the balance of interests
favored forum law. The crime was committed in Rhode Island and the trial was
held in Rhode Island. The victim was a resident of Rhode Island, the defendant
"had at least a friendly relationship with the victim . .. in the State of Rhode Is-
land," and many of the State's witnesses "either reside [d] or [were] employed,
or at the least were [in the state], when th[e] homicide took place."174 And the
State "ha[d] an interest in apprehending those who commit[ted] crimes within
its borders and prosecuting those accused according to its laws."1 75
167. For an extended discussion of the modem choice-of-law revolution and the various theories
that arose in the late ioos, see SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 93-115.
168. 756 A.2d 731 (R.I. 2000).
169. Id. at 733, 739-40.
170. Id. at 733.
171. Id. at 739.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 739-40 (quoting Victoria v. Smythe, 703 A.2d 619, 620-21 (R.I. 1997) (per curiam)).
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Other courts have taken similar approaches that require a balancing of vari-
ous factors. 176 And like the Briggs court, none appears to have considered
whether another conflict-of-laws approach would be preferable or to have ex-
plained why it was appropriate to adopt the particular approach that it did.
As a threshold matter, courts applying these approaches neglect to determine
whether two state constitutions apply, and instead proceed directly to the con-
flict-of-laws analysis.1 7 7 As in other contexts, this is problematic because only
when an officer is bound by two conflicting laws is it necessary to perform a full
conflict-of-laws analysis. Consider again the facts of Briggs. If Rhode Island's
Constitution does not bind state actors operating out of state, then only the stric-
tures of the New Hampshire Constitution are relevant.1 7 1 It is thus critical for a
court to first interpret the relevant constitutions to determine whether the forum
state's constitution applies extraterritorially or the situs state's constitution ap-
plies to out-of-state officers acting in the situs state. 179
Moreover, even assuming that two laws conflict, the multifactor choice-of-
law theories suffer from additional flaws. Most troubling, courts give too little
weight to the purposes of the exclusionary rule and too much weight to factors
irrelevant to the administration of the criminal justice system. In theory, multi-
factor approaches should give different weights to different factors depending
on the context of a given case. The drafters of the Second Restatement, for ex-
176. See, e.g., People v. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill. 1971) (noting that "from the viewpoint of
'significant relationship' or 'center of gravity' rules, the significant contacts were with Illinois.
The crime was committed in Illinois; it was being prosecuted there; the defendant was a res-
ident and citizen of Illinois; the great majority of the witnesses, who would testify at the trial,
were Illinois residents; Indiana had no vital contact with the crime; and the application of
Illinois evidentiary law would not offend the comity of interstate relationships between Indi-
ana and Illinois."); cf Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 716 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Pa. 1998) (determining
that Pennsylvania (forum) law does not apply to a search performed by a federal agent in
California because "Pennsylvania has no interest in a canine sniff search conducted within
California's borders, even if the results are later used in the Pennsylvania Courts").
177. See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
178. Cf United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-75 (1990) (analogously determining
that the federal Fourth Amendment does not always bind U.S. law enforcement agents oper-
ating abroad).
179. See Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and CriminalJustice: Two Problems and a Response,
22 RUTGERs L.J. 863, 874 (1991) ("Failure to consider as a threshold issue the jurisdictional
scope of the applicable state constitutional provision runs the risk of fruitless analysis, or
worse, of interpretation by sheer inadvertence."); Gerald L. Neuman, Conflict of Constitutions?
No Thanks: A Response to Professors Brilmayer and Kreimer, 91 MICH. L. REv. 939, 945 (1993)
(" [T]he first question is one of constitutionalism, not conflict of laws . . . .").
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ample, wrote that the lists of factors provided in the Restatement are not exclu-
sive.so Instead, not only the lists but the weight of the factors in those lists
should depend on the case."' The domicile of the parties, for instance, may be
important in some tort cases, but is usually given substantially less weight than
the state where the disputed conduct occurred because that state "has an obvious
interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing
redress for injuries that occurred there."18 2 In the interstate search-and-seizure
context, the domicile of the parties, the location of the witnesses, and similar
factors have nothing to do with either state's interest in promoting the purposes
(e.g., deterrence) that underlie their exclusionary rules.' As a result they
should, at the very least, be given substantially less weight than they are currently
given in cases like Briggs.
To be sure, some courts that adopt one of these approaches do consider some
variant of "governmental interest" when performing their analyses, but they of-
ten mischaracterize what the governmental interest is. In Briggs, for example, the
court determined that Rhode Island "has an interest in apprehending those who
commit crimes within its borders and prosecuting those accused according to its
laws."184 This description is too general. Each of the states involved in a conflict
case have a specific interest in furthering the purposes underlying their exclu-
sionary rules. Characterizing the relevant interests in any other way risks com-
promising those purposes,' which can include deterrence, ensuring the integ-
rity of the judicial system, and maintaining the public's trust in government. 186
18o. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAw INST. 1971).
181. Id. ("Undoubtedly, a court will on occasion give consideration to other factors in deciding a
question of choice of law .... [A]nd varying weight will be given to a particular factor, or to
a group of factors, in different areas of choice of law.").
182. Id. § 145 cmt. d. On the other hand, concerns about issues like uniformity and administrative
ease take on greater importance when determining the law governing intestate succession of
movables. The Restatement therefore provides that the law of the state where the decedent
was domiciled should apply. Id. § 260 & cmt. b.
183. See Corr, supra note 17, at 1227-30 (arguing that interest analysis is insufficiently sensitive to
the unique policies at play in the search-and-seizure context); Latzer, supra note 179, at 873
(arguing that interest analysis is "at best, an inelegant fit [in the exclusionary-rule context],
because such matters as the domicile of parties and witnesses, important in civil disputes, are
irrelevant in criminal cases"); Richard Tullis & Linda Ludlow, Admissibility of Evidence Seized
inAnotherJurisdiction: Choice ofLaw and the Exclusionary Rule, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 67, 88 (1975).
184. State v. Briggs, 756 A.2d 731, 740 (R.I. 2000).
185. Cf Corr, supra note 17, at 1228 (arguing that courts inaccurately characterize the relevant in-
terests when using interest analysis to resolve interstate search-and-seizure cases).
186. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the Briggs court gave no attention to whether the conflict rule it an-
nounced would actually further the goal of deterring police misconduct or any
of the other values underlying Rhode Island's or New Hampshire's exclusionary
rules.
Finally, multifactor conflict-of-law theories usually result in application of
forum law. "' As a result, they raise the same concerns discussed in Section III.B:
they will frequently dictate application of forum law even when application of
that law offers no deterrence-related or other benefits. Together these flaws make
modern multifactor theories, as applied by the courts, a poor fit. Current courts
fail to perform the necessary threshold inquiry into whether two laws conflict,
mischaracterize the relevant state interests, and are prone to be inappropriately
biased in favor of forum law.
D. State- Constitutional-Law Analysis
A fourth approach that has gained traction among courts focuses exclusively
on the state constitutional question. Courts that employ this approach typically
begin by correctly considering whether the forum state's constitution should be
interpreted to apply extraterritorially to the officers or defendants. But the courts
end their analyses too soon. Instead of considering whether both constitutions
apply and, if both apply, determining in a separate analysis which should prevail,
they generally ignore the potential applicability of situs law. To be clear, these
courts may not consider themselves to be engaging in a conflict analysis. But that
is the effect when they explicitly or implicitly refuse to apply a potentially rele-
vant state law. Viewed in that light, the approach is unjustifiably biased in favor
of forum law.
In State v. Davis,' for example, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the ad-
missibility of evidence obtained in Mississippi by Mississippi officers because
there was no violation of Oregon (forum) law. Pursuant to a fugitive warrant
issued in Mississippi for arrest warrants issued in Oregon, Mississippi officers
187. See Corr, supra note 17, at 1220-23, 1231. A number of reasons could account for this forum
bias. Corr notes that courts frequently view a crime, an associated search, and its prosecution
as a single entity, rather than as a series of events that might give rise to different interests.
Thus, forum law will usually prevail because of the forum state's interest in prosecuting crimes
within its borders, even though another state might have a substantial interest in regulating
the relevant police conduct. Id. at 1228; see also Tullis & Ludlow, supra note 183, at 88-89 (crit-
icizing the Saiken court for failing to afford adequate weight to the situs state's search-related
contact when it performed the significant-relationship test). In addition, most modem theo-
ries are self-avowedly biased in favor of the forum when a particular analysis is otherwise
inconclusive. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 22, at 103.
188. 834 P.2d loo8, 1012-13 (Or. 1992).
439
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
arrested the defendant in his mother's home in Mississippi.1"' The defendant
argued that the arrest violated Oregon law because it was effectuated without a
search warrant for his mother's house.o90 Interestingly, the court agreed that the
Oregon Constitution applied to the Mississippi officers. Based on constitutional
text and precedent, the court concluded that the forum constitution protected all
in-state defendants: "It does not matter where . . . evidence was obtained (in-
state or out-of-state), or what governmental entity (local, state, federal, or out-
of-state) obtained it; the constitutionally significant fact is that the Oregon gov-
ernment seeks to use the evidence in an Oregon criminal prosecution."' 9 But the
court went on to hold that there was no violation of either the Oregon or Federal
Constitution. The evidence, according to the court, was therefore admissible.1 92
In so holding, the court failed to consider the third relevant source of law:
the Mississippi Constitution. At no point did it ask whether the officers were
bound by the Mississippi Constitution and, if so, why it was appropriate to apply
forum law instead of situs law. Nor, for that matter, did it explain why it chose
to adopt this particular approach rather than any of the other approaches dis-
cussed in this Part.1 9 3
Courts that hold that the forum constitution does not apply are most likely
to resolve the case correctly, in part because they are left without a conflict.194
The only remaining question is whether the situs state's constitution governs in
addition to the U.S. Constitution. In these cases, courts have, to varying degrees,
189. Id. at loo9.
19o. Id.
191. Id. at 1012-13.
192. Id. at 1014.
193. See also People v. Nieto, 746 N.Y.S.2d 371, 378 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (similarly failing to consider
the applicability of situs law, in this case New Jersey law, and holding that the forum consti-
tution, here the New York Constitution, controlled the admissibility of evidence obtained by
New York officers in New Jersey because the New York Constitution "appl [ies] extra-territo-
rially to every New York defendant").
194. See, e.g., State v. Bridges, 925 P.2d 357, 367 (Haw. 1996) (holding, based on an exclusionary-
rule analysis, that the Hawaii (forum) Constitution did not govern the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained in California by Hawaii and California officers, in part because "admitting the
evidence in the instant case would not tarnish the integrity of the courts" since "no relevant
Hawai'i law applies extraterritorially to the conduct of its agents"), overruled by State v. Torres,
262 P.3d 1oo6 (Haw. 2011); Helm v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1991) (holding that
the Kentucky Constitution did not apply to Ohio officers operating in Ohio and that the search
was lawful under Ohio law); State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1324 (N.J. 1989) (holding that
forum law did not apply to federal officers unless the officers were acting as agents of forum
officers, in part because "a state constitution ordinarily governs only the conduct of the state's
own agents or others acting under color of state law").
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considered the applicability of situs law. But courts do not always give appropri-
ate weight to situs law, and at least one court has failed to consider whether situs
law applies at all - even after it found that forum law did not apply. In State v.
Rivers, 95 the Supreme Court of Louisiana considered the legality of an automo-
bile search performed by Alabama officers in Alabama. Instead of explicitly de-
termining whether both the Alabama and Louisiana Constitutions applied, the
court simply held that " [s]ince th[e] search occurred in Alabama, [the court is]
not concerned with provisions of the Louisiana Constitution, Article I, Section
5," and proceeded to determine only whether there was a Federal Constitutional
violation.196 It offered no explanation for its failure to consider the applicability
of the Alabama Constitution.
This tendency to give insufficient attention to situs law contravenes the basic
conflict-of-laws principle that forum bias -which destroys uniformity, encour-
ages forum shopping, and aggravates interstate tensions - should be minimized.
Whether for constitutional or normative reasons, modern theorists generally
strive to craft objective tests that can identify the appropriate law in a way that is
rational, predictable, and fair." Perhaps these courts believe that constitutional
law deserves special consideration and should be permitted to circumvent this
fundamental goal. But thus far, courts and scholars have failed to articulate and
defend any such theory. And in practice, courts have treated constitutional pro-
visions no differently than other forms of law, 98 which suggests that there is
little support for a special rule permitting forum favoritism in constitutional
cases.
To be clear, the instinct to consider whether a constitution applies to a par-
ticular search is correct. The problem with this approach is that current courts
are failing to consider the applicability of all the potentially relevant laws.
195. 420 So. 2d 1128, 1131-32 (La. 1982).
196. Id. at 1132.
197. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Wahl v. Gen. Elec. Co., 786 F.3d 491, 5oo (6th Cir. 2015) (applying Tennessee's stat-
ute of repose, rather than the Ohio Constitution's Right to Remedy Clause, because standard
choice-of-law analysis favored Tennessee law); McMillen v. Winona Nat. & Say. Bank, 648
S.W.2d 460, 462 (Ark. 1983) (upholding the validity of a contract that would have been void
under a usury provision in the Arkansas Constitution because standard choice-of-law analysis
favored Minnesota law); Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d 9 4 9 , 960-61 (Kan. 1992) (applying Kan-
sas constitutional law, rather than Kentucky constitutional law, because standard choice-of-
law analysis favored Kansas law).
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E. Exclusionary-Rule Analysis
"Exclusionary-rule analysis," as some courts have called it,"' enjoys the most
widespread judicial and scholarly support.2 00 Because it is sensitive to the policies
behind exclusionary doctrine, it approaches the right answer. But it is still not
quite right. While there are analytic variations in the cases that adopt this ap-
proach, these courts usually assume that the facts of a given case fall within the
territorial scope of the two disputed laws and then admit or exclude the disputed
evidence based on whether exclusion would further the exclusionary-rule values
(e.g., deterrence) of the forum or some other state. Put differently, the courts fail
to distinguish between the many steps needed to resolve a search-and-seizure
conflict. They do not decide whether two laws reach the facts of a case; if so,
which of those laws should prevail; whether there was a violation of that state's
law; and then finally whether that state's exclusionary rule demands exclusion.
They simply decide the entire question in one analytical step.
As will be discussed, this analysis produces three issues. Most obviously, the
courts fail to perform the necessary first step of determining whether two laws
apply to a case. This, then, leads to a second problem: by not choosing one law
to provide both the constitutional law and the exclusionary doctrine, courts risk
mismatching the exclusionary rule designed to protect one constitutional provi-
sion with a constitutional provision that has its own, separate exclusionary doc-
trine. And finally, the results in these cases consistently diverge even though each
court ostensibly bases its decision on similar exclusionary-rule purposes. As ar-
gued in Part IV, a more predictable approach would better serve at least the de-
terrence rationale.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Echols v. State201 exemplifies this
type of analysis. At issue was whether forum law should apply to out-of-state
officers who had collaborated with an in-state informant.20 2 The defendant
199. See, e.g., Torres, 262 P.3d 1oo6, 1013 (Haw. 2011); State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Minn.
1985).
200. State v. Bridges, 925 P.2d 357, 357 (Haw. 1996) (discussing exclusionary-rule cases and ob-
serving that "[a] Ithough the cases are fairly rare, the trend appears to be toward using the
exclusionary rule analysis. Both courts and commentators have concluded that it is preferable
to use an exclusionary rule analysis rather than the traditional conflicts of law approach to
determine the admissibility of evidence in the forum state which is obtained in another juris-
diction" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Torres,
262 P.3d 1oo6; see also, e.g., Tullis & Ludlow, supra note 183, at 88-91 (advocating for the ex-
clusionary-rule approach).
201. 484 So. 2d 5 68 (Fla. 1985).
202. Id. at 571.
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acknowledged that the evidence was lawfully obtained under situs and federal
law, but argued that it was unlawfully obtained under forum law and that forum
law should govern the case.203 The court was unpersuaded. Without explaining
why it choose the particular approach it did,20 4 the court declared that exclusion
would not serve the "primary purpose of the exclusionary rule" - deterrence -
because exclusion "would [not] have any discernible effect on police officers of
other states who conduct investigations in accordance with the laws of their state
and of the United States Constitution."20 5 In this way, the court jumped straight
to considering whether exclusion was appropriate without first determining
which law to apply. Moreover, because the court did not identify the applicable
law, it was unclear about which exclusionary rule it applied. It cited a U.S. Su-
preme Court case for the "primary purpose" behind exclusionary doctrine, even
though the current case apparently turned on whether situs or forum law ap-
plied. Other cases are similarly misguided.206
203- Id.
204. Few courts have provided any real justification for the use of this approach over any other.
The most significant treatment of the methodological question came from the Hawaii Su-
preme Court, which explained that "the trend [among courts and commentators] appears to
be toward using the exclusionary rule analysis" over one of the other conflict-of-law ap-
proaches and concluded that the exclusionary-rule approach is the "better approach" because
it focuses "specifically on the issues pertaining to conflicts issues in interstate search and sei-
zure cases." Bridges, 925 P.2d at 365.
205. Echols, 484 So. 2d at 571. Because forum and situs officers had collaborated, the court also
noted that Florida's interests would not be served by "imperially attempting to require that
out-of-state police officials follow Florida law . .. when they are requested to cooperate with
Florida officials in investigating crimes committed in Florida." Id. at 572.
206. See, e.g., Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1303 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (adopting People v. Blair's
exclusionary-rule analysis and holding that evidence lawfully obtained under California law
by a California officer in California was admissible in Alaska notwithstanding its potential
illegality under Alaska law); People v. Phillips, 711 P.2d 423, 456 (Cal. 1985) (upholding the
admission of evidence lawfully obtained under Utah (situs) law by Utah officers because "the
purposes of the exclusionary rule would not be served by ... an extraterritorial application"
of California (forum) law); People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 748 (Cal. 1979) (upholding the ad-
mission of evidence lawfully obtained under Pennsylvania (situs) law but unlawfully obtained
under California (forum) law because excluding the evidence would not serve the exclusion-
ary rule's purposes); People v. Orlosky, 115 Cal. Rptr. 598, 6oi (Ct. App. 1974) ("This state
should not be impeded, in a local prosecution for a local crime, by barring evidence which
California law regards as legitimately procured . .. merely to add a wrist slap to a foreign po-
lice officer whose personal interest in a California prosecution must be relatively remote. In-
diana can control its own officers adequately by applying its rules ... in Indiana prosecu-
tions'"); Bridges, 925 P.2d at 372 (similar); State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Minn. 1985)
(determining that "it is preferable to use an exclusionary rule analysis rather than a traditional
conflicts of law approach to determine the admissibility of evidence obtained in another state,'
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Recent decisions have provided more detailed analyses with slight modifica-
tions, but their analyses are still incomplete. In State v. Torres,2 0 7 for example, the
Hawaii Supreme Court held that evidence should be admitted if exclusion would
not serve the purposes underlying Hawaii's exclusionary rule. But it declared
that in evaluating those purposes, courts should give "due consideration" to Ha-
waii's constitution and case law.208 Vhen considering judicial integrity, for in-
stance, courts must give "substantial weight" to Hawaii law that would other-
wise require exclusion of evidence obtained out of state.2 09 As in Echols, the court
did not determine which law to apply. Instead, it immediately performed an ex-
clusionary-rule analysis, this time explicitly based on its own exclusionary doc-
trine. Interestingly, the Torres court did consider whether the search was lawful
according to forum law, but it used that analysis to inform its evaluation of the
exclusionary rule's purposes. It did not instruct lower courts to determine
whether forum or situs law applies and then whether that state's exclusionary
doctrine favors exclusion.210
A smaller number of courts have not made this same mistake of resolving the
entire issue by determining whether the forum state's exclusionary doctrine fa-
vors exclusion. Instead, they have used the forum's exclusionary-rule values to
determine which state's law to apply. They have then applied that state's consti-
tutional law and would presumably also apply its exclusionary doctrine if they
found a constitutional violation. For example, a few courts have adopted the rea-
soning of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Mollica.211 The Mollica court
and holding that the exclusionary rule favors the admission of evidence obtained by situs of-
ficers); see also D'Antorio v. State, 926 P.2d 1158, 1161 n.4 (Alaska 1996) (citing Pooley, 7 0 7 P.2d
at 1302-03, for the proposition that "the law of the jurisdiction where the search occurred is
controlling" absent "ongoing or concerted effort" between Alaska (the forum) and the situs
state). Orlosky is illustrative of the exclusionary-rule approach even though the court stated
that it was applying governmental interest analysis because the court characterized the forum
state's "interests" solely by reference to the state's exclusionary-rule purposes.
207. 262 P.3d 1oo6, 1019 (Haw. 2011). Torres involved evidence obtained by federal officers on a
federal base. But, the court clarified that its analysis applies whenever "evidence sought to be
admitted in state court is the product of acts that occurred on federal property or in another
state, by Hawai'i law enforcement officers or officers of another jurisdiction." Id. at 1021.
2o8. Id.
209. Id. at 1019.
210. See also, e.g., State v. Evers, 815 A.2d 432, 441, 444-46 (N.J. 2003) (holding that New Jersey
(forum) law does not apply and separately assuming a violation of California (situs) law but
applying New Jersey's exclusionary doctrine - not California's - to permit the evidence to be
admitted).
211. 554 A.2d 1315 (N.J. 1989); see, e.g., State v. Cauley, 863 S.W2d 411, 416 (Tenn. 1993) (adopting
Mollica's reasoning); State v. Brown, 940 P.2d 546, 576-78 (Wash. 1997) (same); see also State
v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1089-90 (Conn. 2010) (performing an exclusionary-rule analysis to
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held that New Jersey's constitutional safeguards apply only if the officer that per-
formed a search acted as an agent of the New Jersey (forum) officers.2 12 Accord-
ing to the court, applying the New Jersey Constitution to situs officers when
there was no agency relationship would not further New Jersey's constitutional
goals, which the court defined as the purposes underlying the state's exclusion-
ary rule.2 13 Then, after determining that New Jersey law did not apply, the court
proceeded to hold that the evidence was admissible because the out-of-state of-
ficers had abided by their own jurisdiction's constitutional law.2 14 In other
words, unlike the Echols and Torres courts, the Mollica court did not simply con-
sider whether exclusion was appropriate based on forum law. The court used the
forum's exclusionary-rule values to determine which state's law to apply and then
applied all of that state's law.
The difference between Mollica on the one hand and Echols and Torres on the
other is subtle but critical to understanding the flaws in the different incarna-
tions of the exclusionary-rule approach. First, all three decisions are flawed be-
cause the courts neglected to answer the threshold question of whether two con-
stitutions applied. As a result, each failed to determine whether there was even a
conflict to be resolved.2 15
But the decisions inEchols and Torres have additional problems. Not only did
those courts neglect the initial step, they also skipped a number of intermediate
steps and went straight to analyzing whether the exclusionary rule requires ex-
clusion. In Mollica and its progeny, courts wrongly assumed that more than one
law reached the facts of a particular case, used the values underlying the forum's
exclusionary rule to determine whether forum law should control the case, de-
termined that it should not, and then applied situs constitutional law. Note that
the use of forum law to determine which law to apply is not particularly contro-
determine which of two potentially relevant states' laws governed the case and then applying
that state's constitutional law).
212. Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1326.
213. Id. at 1328 ("None of [New Jersey's exclusionary-rule] values [e.g., deterrence and judicial
integrity], however, is genuinely threatened by a search and seizure of evidence, conducted by
the officers of another jurisdiction under the authority and in conformity with the law of their
own jurisdiction, that is totally independent of [New Jersey's] own government officers.").
The court also explained that its holding was consistent with the "inherent jurisdictional lim-
itations" of state constitutions, id. at 1327, which "ordinarily govern [] only the conduct of the
state's own agents or others acting under color of state law," id. at 1324.
214. Id. at 1328-29. This case involved federal officers operating out of state, but the court's reason-
ing applies equally well to conflicts involving state officers (and it has in fact been applied to
that context). See sources cited supra note 211.
215. See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
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versial. Under current doctrine, forum law dictates a court's choice-of-law meth-
odology.2 16 What is important is that despite the initial unjustified assumption
that both laws reached the case and thus that the only question was which of the
two should be given priority, the courts ultimately determined which of two laws
should apply and used only that state's law to completely resolve the dispute. To
be sure, these courts only confronted cases where situs law was held to apply,
and they never determined that there was a constitutional violation. As a result,
they were never required to consider the potential applicability of any exclusion-
ary rule, forum or situs. But their logic suggests that if they had determined that
situs law was violated, they would have applied the situs state's exclusionary rule,
not the forum state's exclusionary rule.
In contrast, the Echols and Torres courts used the values underlying the forum
or some other exclusionary rule not to determine which law to apply, but to de-
termine - regardless of the applicable law - whether to admit or exclude the ev-
idence. In effect, they inappropriately divorced an exclusionary rule from its un-
derlying constitution. Recall that a state's exclusionary rule is tied to its Fourth
Amendment analogue.2 17 That is why Hawaii can maintain an exclusionary rule
with three purposes - deterrence of police misconduct, preserving judicial integ-
rity, and the protection of individual privacy- and Connecticut can maintain an
exclusionary rule with a single purpose - deterrence of police misconduct.2 18 In
both Echols and Torres, the exclusionary rules designed to protect one constitu-
tion were potentially mismatched with constitutions that have separate exclu-
sionary rules with distinct substantive values. The Echols court did not even at-
tempt to identify the source of the exclusionary rule it applied. And while the
Torres court did clearly state that it was applying Hawaii's exclusionary rule, it
never determined whether Hawaii law applied. As a result, Hawaii's exclusionary
rule may have been applied to a case that should have been governed by another
state's law.
Lastly, the exclusionary-rule approach has a final flaw: it is unpredictable.
Like other balancing tests, the relevant factors can be difficult to apply, and the
test permits judicial manipulation.2 19 The dissent in Torres, for example, criti-
cized the Hawaii court's "substantial weight" standard, which requires "due con-
sideration" of the Hawaii Constitution, for being "simply too murky for trial
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws 5 5 cnts. a & b, § 6(1) cmt. a.
217. See supra Section I.B.
218. Compare State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1oo6, 1018 (Haw. 2011), with State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071,
1o86 (Conn. 2010).
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courts to utilize and apply consistently."22 0 This concern is of even greater im-
portance in the exclusionary-rule context. As elaborated in Section IV.B.1, the
deficit of clear guidance regarding what is and is not lawful compromises the
goal of deterring police misconduct by sowing confusion and uncertainty.22 1
The above flaws are substantial. All courts applying a version of the exclu-
sionary-rule approach neglect to first determine whether two laws apply and
hence whether a conflict exists. Some further muddy the analysis by applying an
exclusionary rule that does not necessarily match the constitution that governs
the case. And either way, the approach threatens the deterrent value of the exclu-
sionary rule by producing unpredictable results.
IV. THE LAW-OF-THE-OFFICER APPROACH
By now it should be clear that no current approach provides a satisfactory
answer to interstate search-and-seizure conflicts of law. Each suffers from sub-
stantial conceptual and practical flaws. To be sure, a perfect solution that is both
theoretically sound and pragmatically unobjectionable is unlikely; few common-
law doctrines are without defects. But the two-step approach that follows pro-
vides a more workable and coherent solution that is consistent with the purpose
and intended reach of the relevant laws. Consistent with the two-step frame-
work championed by Roosevelt, Section IVA argues that courts should first de-
termine whether two constitutions apply. Section 1V.B then argues that if a con-
flict exists, courts should apply the law of the officer who performed the search
because that rule best comports with the values underlying exclusionary doc-
trine - especially deterrence.
This particular two-step process is constitutionally feasible and methodolog-
ically distinct. Constitutionally, it is sound because all of the involved states have
a legitimate contact with the search and hence application of either situs or fo-
rum law will be constitutionally permissible.2 22 Relatedly, the approach is sensi-
tive to federalism concerns.223 It does not discriminate against out-of-state citi-
zens or another state's law because it is inherently reciprocal. Courts are
220. Torres, 262 P.3 d at 1028 (Nakayama, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221. Cf Latzer, supra note 179, at 867 (discussing arguments against interpreting state constitu-
tions differently from the Federal Constitution because "the police are less able than the bench
or bar to cope with sudden changes in the law, especially changes calling for subtle distinc-
tions").
222. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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instructed to apply forum law when a forum officer engages in a search extrater-
ritorially, but, critically, courts must cede control over the resolution of cases in-
volving searches performed by a situs officer to situs law.
A brief note on methodology is also in order. The following rationale is rem-
iniscent of the exclusionary-rule approach currently taken by a majority of
courts.2 24 That is for good reason. Those courts properly fashioned a rule that
takes into account the purpose of exclusionary doctrine, an insight on which the
law-of-the-officer approach builds. However, this proposal is theoretically and
practically distinct from the exclusionary-rule approach in key ways. First, the
law-of-the-officer approach requires courts to first consider whether two laws
apply. As a result, courts can identify situations in which no conflict exists be-
cause only one law reaches the facts of the case. Second, the proposed conflict
rule requires courts to determine which law to apply before determining whether
exclusion is appropriate. Put differently, the law-of-the-officer approach results
in the decision to apply either situs or forum law. After that choice is made, a
court must still determine whether there was a violation of the applicable law
and, if so, whether exclusion is appropriate. This contrasts with the approach of
many current courts, which apply an untethered exclusionary rule to a case that
could be governed by another state's constitutional law.
There is also a salient practical difference between the approach proposed
here and the exclusionary-rule approach. Consider cases where two laws apply.
To resolve the conflicts in these cases, the courts that have employed the exclu-
sionary-rule approach have thus far adhered to a balancing test that provides
little predictability or consistency from case to case - even though predictability
and consistency are especially critical to deterrence. By providing a bright-line
rule, the law-of-the-officer approach maximizes the deterrent effect of the rem-
edy.2 25
A. Step 1: State-Constitutional-Law Analysis
The first step in resolving an interstate search-and-seizure conflict should be
to interpret the situs and forum state constitutions to determine which, if any,
reach the facts of the search. As Roosevelt makes clear, this is an important first
step in any conflict-of-laws analysis because courts must determine whether a
conflict exists before applying a conflict rule.226 Consider a case in which a crime
is committed in New Jersey and forum officers perform a related search in New
York. The court must interpret the New Jersey Constitution to determine
224. See supra Section III.E.
225. See infra Section IV.B.i.
226. See supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
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whether it binds state agents acting out of state, and it must interpret the New
York Constitution to determine whether it binds all state actors, whether or not
they are acting under the authority of New York law.
Few generalizations in this regard are possible. Different constitutions can
have different jurisdictional interpretations depending on text, precedent, and
state constitutional philosophy.227 Some might apply to every in-state defendant,
no matter where a given investigation took place or the identity of the officer
who performed the search. The Oregon Supreme Court determined that this was
the correct interpretation of the Oregon Constitution due to, among other
things, its unique text and precedent.22 8 Others, like the Kentucky Constitution,
might apply only to state officers and therefore have no application to searches
performed by out-of-state officers.22 9 And some might chart a middle course and
apply to state officers as well as those acting under color of forum state law, as
the New Jersey Constitution does.230
In the interstate search-and-seizure context, as in other contexts, four sce-
narios are possible: situs law alone could apply, forum law alone could apply,
neither forum nor situs law could apply, or both forum and situs law could apply.
If only situs law applies, then the court need only apply the situs constitution
and that constitution's exclusionary rule. Thus, the Helm court was able to avoid
a conflict-of-laws analysis altogether because the Kentucky (forum) Constitu-
tion did not apply to out-of-state officers. Similarly, if only forum law applies,
the court need only apply the forum constitution and its corresponding exclu-
sionary rule. And if no state constitution applies, then the court should simply
apply the Federal Constitution and its exclusionary rule. Only in the fourth sce-
nario, where both situs and forum law applies, is there the need to perform a
conflict-of-laws analysis. In other words, many cases that are currently under-
stood to pose a conflict-of-laws question may be easily resolvable without resort
to any conflict analysis because they do not fall within this fourth category of
cases. 23 1
227. See Brenner, supra note 25, at 66-76 (discussing different state constitutional arguments);
Latzer, supra note 179, at 880-81; Neuman, supra note 179, at 945-46.
228. State v. Davis, 834 P.2d loo8, 1012-13 (Or. 1992); see also People v. Nieto, 746 N.Y.S.2d 371,
376-78 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (adopting a similar interpretation of the New York Constitution).
229. Helm v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Ky. 1991) ("This Court has recognized that
our state's constitution is a limitation only on the state to authorize, and its officers to engage
in a search for, and seizure of evidence of crime.').
230. See State v. Mollica, 55 4 A.2d 1315, 1328-29 (N.J. 1989).
231. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 88, at 1.
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B. Step 2: Application of the Law of the Officer
If both forum and situs law apply, an actual conflict exists. In those cases,
courts must fashion some rule of decision that will predictably and justly identify
a single law to resolve the conflict. As discussed above, the Federal Constitution
provides little guidance.2 32 instead, courts are left to create a rule using the tra-
ditional common-law tools of reason, history, and experience.23 3 Those sources
support the law-of-the-officer approach. If a forum officer physically obtains the
evidence, then forum law should apply, no matter the location of the search.
Similarly, if a situs officer physically obtains the evidence, situs law should apply.
Finally, if both forum and situs officers cooperate in a single search, the court
should apply the law of the situs officer.
This Section describes how this rule is consistent with the values underlying
the exclusionary rule, most notably deterrence. Cases involving officers from
only one state are discussed first, followed by those involving cooperation be-
tween officers from more than one state.
1. The Values Underlying the Exclusionary Rule
Deterrence continues to be the primary determinant of the scope of exclu-
sionary doctrine. The federal exclusionary rule is now justified and applied based
entirely on whether the rule's application will deter police misconduct.234 And a
number of states have followed suit, emphasizing deterrence as the central pur-
pose behind their exclusionary rules.235 Because of its prominence as a justifica-
tion for most exclusionary rules, deterrence is given substantial weight in the
analysis that follows.
A few states have also articulated additional exclusionary-rule purposes.
While there is a range of nondeterrence policy rationales,236 the most common
are "the imperative of judicial integrity" and maintaining the public's trust in
government by "assuring the people that the government will not profit from its
232. See supra Part II.
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws S 5 cmt. b (AM. LAw INST. 1971) (" [A
state] derives [its conflicts] law from the same sources which are used for determining all its
law: from constitutions, treaties and statutes, from precedent, from considerations of ethical
and social need and of public policy in general, from analogy, and from other forms of legal
reasoning.").
234. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Section I.B.
236. At least one state - Hawaii, for example - has articulated an additional purpose: the protec-
tion of individual privacy. State v. Torres, 262 P.3 d 1oo6, 1018 (Haw. 2011).
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lawless behavior."237 Section IV.B.1 considers each of these rationales. Because
both depend on whether a particular action was lawless, neither has any analyt-
ical weight at the conflict-of-laws stage. It does not make sense to argue that
application of one or another law would sanction illegality because it is the le-
gality of a particular search that is the fundamental issue in a conflict-of-laws
case.
a. Deterrence
The law-of-the-officer approach maximizes the deterrent effect of state ex-
clusionary rules by employing a bright-line rule that, through its predictability,
furthers adherence to the law of the officer's state. Of course, the degree to which
the exclusion of evidence actually deters is contested.23 8 But whatever the empir-
ical reality, deterrence is the predominant rationale in the case law and applying
the law of the officer maximizes whatever deterrent effect exclusionary doctrine
does have.
Although many still dispute the virtues of rules versus judicial standards, the
consensus view is that the appropriate approach depends on the specific legal
context.23 Rules and standards exist on a continuum of discretion, with stand-
ards affording decisionmakers the most flexibility.240 In broad strokes, rules re-
quire a given response to a defined set of facts, while standards, including mul-
tifactor balancing tests, give decisionmakers greater flexibility by allowing them
to apply a generic background principle or policy to a factual situation.24 1 The
two forms diverge along a number of metrics. Rules are costlier to formulate but
less costly to apply. They afford regulated entities predictability and certainty so
that they can order their affairs productively. And they minimize the potential
237. LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 1-5 (c).
238. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 368-69 (collecting citations and concluding that "[n]o one is
going to win the empirical debate over whether the exclusionary rule deters the police from
committing a significant number of illegal searches and seizures").
239. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 98, at 1167-74 (defending the use of standards to
resolve conflict cases); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HAlRv. L. REv. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976) (discussing different perspectives on rules and stand-
ards); Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287
(20o6) (defending rules); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1175 (1989) (defending rules); Kathleen M. Sullivan, TheJustices ofRules and Standards,
1o6 HAlv. L. REv. 22, 57-69 (1992) (outlining the debate); James G. Wilson, Surveying the
Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 773-76
(1995) (collecting citations and explaining that the right approach depends on the context).
240. Sullivan, supra note 239, at 57-58.
241. Id. at 58.
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for arbitrary choices by decisionmakers.24 2 in contrast, standards are less costly
to develop but costlier to apply. They avoid rules' characteristic over- or under-
inclusiveness by allowing decisionmakers to calibrate their responses to the facts
at issue. And they permit doctrines to more easily adapt to changing circum-
stances.243 These relative virtues and vices naturally lend themselves to different
doctrines, including within the conflict-of-laws field.244
In the interstate search-and-seizure setting, a bright-line rule is preferable.
The same benefits that generally attend rules are present in this context and sup-
port the law-of-the-officer approach. Unlike the exclusionary-rule approach and
multifactor conflict-of-laws approaches, the law-of-the-officer proposal is easily
administrable and minimizes the risk of arbitrary decisions by lower courts
forced to apply vague principles. There is no need to engage in the complicated
"significant weight test" set out in Torres, the "interest-weighing approach" set
out in Briggs, or any other highly discretionary analysis based on ambiguous fac-
tors.24 5 instead, the appropriate law is easily identified based on the identity of
the officer who physically performed the search.
But there is an even more important reason why a rule - specifically one that
favors the law of the officer who performed the search -is appropriate here. A
clear directive would maximize the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in the
officer's home state, the only exclusionary rule that could plausibly impact his or
her behavior. Exclusionary rules deter by punishing.24 6 Evidence unlawfully ob-
tained is inadmissible and therefore cannot be used in a case against a defendant
officers have pursued. This deterrent effect requires both that officers under-
stand what actions are unlawful24 7 and that the "punishment" (i.e., exclusion)
be consistently and predictably applied to cases involving officer misconduct.248
Both goals are served by a bright-line rule.
242. Id. at 62-66.
243. Id. at 66-69; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J.
557 (1992) (using an economic analysis to explain the different characteristics of rules and
standards).
244. See supra notes 1o8-1o9 and accompanying text.
245. A number of scholars have advocated such approaches. Professor Morrison, for instance, ad-
vocates for the use of "displacement analysis with a mode of better law reasoning." Morrison,
supra note 219, at 58o (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that approach, courts are to
"inquir[e] whether there are circumstances in the case calling for the forum to displace forum
law." Id.
246. Slobogin, supra note 5, at 373.
247. See William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 321 (1991).
248. Slobogin, supra note 5, at 374.
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William Heffernan and Richard Lovely have argued that there is a cognitive
component to deterrence: only officers who understand what the law prohibits
can plausibly be deterred from performing prohibited acts.249 Moreover, there is
evidence that simplification increases officers' understanding of their legal obli-
gations.2 50 Based on a 1991 study, Heffernan and Lovely concluded that the dra-
matic difference between officers' understanding of Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment law can be attributed to differences in complexity.2 51 Almost a hundred
percent of participating officers understood the bright-line rules set out in Mi-
randa v. Arizona,2 52 while only about half of the officers understood the Fourth
Amendment's more complex doctrine. According to the authors, "[i]f equally
simple rules governed search and seizure, the possibility of deterrence would be
substantially enhanced."2 53
To be sure, Heffernan and Lovely noted that limited simplification of Fourth
Amendment doctrine is unlikely to be effective because of the doctrine's inherent
complexity.254 They explained that employing a bright-line rule for one type of
intrusion does not produce the same results as Miranda because of the sheer
number of rules and standards that govern all other intrusions. Individual rules
do not always attract officers' attention and are difficult to understand because
mastery of any one rule requires an understanding of when that one rule applies
and when it does not. In contrast, the Miranda rules deal comprehensively with
custodial interrogations. This makes them easier to master and gives officers the
assurance that if they know the few Miranda rules, they will be able to lawfully
navigate most situations involving custodial interrogations.2 5 s But it stands to
reason that a simple conflict-of-laws rule will clarify the legal requirements for
at least some frequently encountered Fourth Amendment situations. Think of
the issue inBurge: whether a spouse could consent to the search of a defendant's
home.256 The question likely comes up frequently, and a rule that a spouse can
or cannot consent to a search is easily understood. Consistently enforcing that
and similar rules will at least not disturb officers' understanding of the law they
249. Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 247, at 321.
250. Id. at 339-40.
251. Id.
252. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
253. Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 247, at 340.
254. Id. at 342-45.
255. Id. at 343-44.
256. Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); see also supra notes 135-137 and
accompanying text (discussing the case).
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do know by adding the potential application of another state's law and thus an
additional layer of complexity. 25 7
In addition, even assuming that officers fully understand the law, the deter-
rent effect of exclusion also depends on the consistency of the "punishment." In
his analysis of the deterrent effect of the federal exclusionary rule, Christopher
Slobogin summarizes a number of punishment-related insights from the field of
behavioral economics.2 58 Two are particularly relevant here: punishment should
follow misconduct as frequently as possible and incidental rewards from the
misconduct should be kept to a minimum. 25 9
For better or worse, exclusionary doctrine is already inconsistently applied
in ways that impact its punishment-related effects. Sometimes police do not
make an arrest, so there is no opportunity for illegally obtained evidence to be
excluded. Other times an arrest is made but the search-and-seizure issue is never
litigated because the defendant accepts a plea deal or the police do not pursue an
investigation.260 It would be a mistake to add to this inconsistency by sometimes
admitting evidence unlawfully obtained under the law of the officer's home state
or excluding evidence lawfully obtained under the law of the officer's state. State
courts have enough difficulty communicating clear signals about appropriate be-
havior without the static of inconsistent and stray pronouncements based on an-
other state's law.
This consideration is not only important to achieve the specific deterrence of
individual officers that have already engaged in misconduct, but also the general
deterrence of officers who could commit a future search-and-seizure violation.
General deterrence is achieved when there is a "perception of real punish-
ment."2 6 1 Applying a law other than that of the officer's home state -particularly
when that law would allow for the admission of otherwise excludable evidence -
257. Cf Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Rob-
inson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 ("A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by
all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline dis-
tinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges
eagerly feed, but they may be literally impossible of application by the officer in the field."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
258. Slobogin, supra note 5, at 373-74.
259. Id. at 374. The other identified insights are incapable of being addressed through a conflicts
rule. For example, Slobogin notes that all misconduct should ideally be detected and the pun-
ishment should be delivered immediately after the misconduct. Id. No conflicts rule will bring
a given exclusionary rule any closer or farther from achieving these goals.
26o. Id. at 374-75; see also Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1413-15 (1986) (de-
lineating the many ways in which unlawfully obtained evidence can still prove useful to police
officers).
261. Slobogin, supra note 5, at 380.
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will only make the threat of exclusion seem more unpredictable and remote to
other officers. As a result, the incentives to invest in learning to abide by forum
law will be compromised.26 2 Put simply, consistency and predictability- the
hallmarks of rules-based doctrines - take on newfound importance when deter-
rence is the objective. Rules, rather than standards, are best able to facilitate the
necessary intergovernmental communication.2 63
These prerequisites of deterrence are also why a bright-line rule that favors
the law of the officer who performed the search is preferable to a bright-line ter-
ritorial rule. As discussed above,264 territorial rules are blind to the content of the
relevant laws. In this case, a territorial rule will sacrifice the deterrence goal of
exclusionary doctrine by setting an unrealistic goal. For a territorial rule to have
any deterrent effect, police officers must be capable of internalizing both their
own state's law - which governs the vast majority of their work2 6 5 - and the
search-and-seizure law of any other state involved in the search. This is unreal-
istic. Instead of achieving this goal, requiring officers to know two different
search-and-seizure doctrines will add detrimental complexity and compromise
the consistency and predictability of the punishment of exclusion.
Moreover, even if it were possible for police officers to fully comprehend and
correctly apply the laws of multiple states, there will always be some set of cases
in which it would be impossible for an officer to know which law to apply. Con-
sider again Orlosky, in which situs officers obtained evidence of a forum-state
crime in the course of investigating an entirely distinct situs-state crime. The
situs officers could not have known that some other law would apply before they
began the search.
In the digital age, it will only be harder for officers to know which state's law
will apply. Recall the facts of Evers.266 Based on interactions in an online chat
room, a situs officer obtained a search warrant from a situs court that required
AOL to turn over the names and billing addresses of various users, including the
262. Cf id. at 380-81 (arguing, for similar reasons, that the federal exclusionary rule is a poor tool
for general deterrence for similar reasons); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and
Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 807, 822-23 (2002) (arguing that
a "meta-rule" is preferable to a "meta-standard" for determining when Chevron deference ap-
plies because rules provide greater predictability about legal payoffs and thus facilitate plan-
ning and investment by subordinate governmental actors).
263. See Merrill, supra note 262, at 823-24 (arguing that rules better facilitate intergovernmental
communication in the administrative-law context).
264. See supra Section IIB.
265. Latzer, supra note 179, at 868 (" [Officers] are attuned to the rules and laws of their own state,
and to those Supreme Court decisions that directly affect their work.").
266. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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defendant. Of course, the officer could not have known beforehand that the de-
fendant resided in New Jersey and therefore that New Jersey law might apply.
Remote computer searches pose similar problems. 2 6 7 Emerging technologies do
not just make interstate searches more prevalent, they make ex ante determina-
tions regarding the relevant law increasingly difficult or impossible. In those sit-
uations, it does not serve deterrence to hold officers accountable to a law they
could not have anticipated. The consistency and simplicity of the law-of-the-
officer approach, on the other hand, provides clear guidance to officers.
In addition, sacrificing probative evidence in situations like these could risk
delegitimizing the exclusionary remedy and further impair compliance with
search-and-seizure law. Drawing on Tom Tyler's research, Slobogin argues that
if officers view the exclusionary rule as illegitimate, they will be more likely to
ignore the judiciary's dictates.26 8 Some research suggests that officers are already
skeptical of exclusionary doctrine.2 69 Excluding evidence because officers failed
to follow a law that they could not possibly have anticipated will likely accelerate
the spread of more negative perceptions.27 0
In recent years, the Supreme Court has also been increasingly concerned
about punishing officers who are not truly culpable, and its logic corroborates
the reasoning here. In developing the so-called "good-faith" exception to the
federal exclusionary rule, the Court has been skeptical that punishing nonculpa-
ble conduct is consistent with the value of deterrence.2 71 One of the most recent
articulations of the exception, which permits the admission of evidence seized in
"good faith" by law enforcement officers, came in Davis v. United States.2 72 There,
the Court allowed the admission of evidence obtained during a search conducted
in reasonable reliance on appellate precedent that was subsequently overruled.
The Supreme Court maintained that exclusion "should not be applied to deter
267. Cf Brenner, supra note 25, at 55-60, 63-80 (discussing how traditional conflict approaches
might be used to resolve cases involving remote computer searches).
268. Slobogin, supra note 5, at 383-84.
269. Id. at 383.
270. Cf id. ("Disregarding the degree of officer culpability is likely to exacerbate that sense of un-
fairness considerably because then the rule exacts its penalty not only when the officer turns
out to be right about the suspect, but even when there was no reason to believe that the collar
was bad.").
271. Note that because the Court's reasoning is premised entirely on the deterrence rationale, the
Court's analysis is instructive of how any court, state or federal, might evaluate a given exclu-
sionary rule's potential to deter police misconduct in legally ambiguous situations.
272. 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011) ("Because suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct
in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the
public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.").
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objectively reasonable law enforcement activity."273 Instead, exclusion is only ap-
propriate when a police officer's actions "are deliberate enough to yield 'mean-
ingfu[l1]' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the jus-
tice system."'2 74 The officers in Davis did not act "deliberately, recklessly, or with
gross negligence"; nor did the case involve any "recurring or systemic negli-
gence."2 75 Because an officer "who conducts a search in reliance on binding ap-
pellate precedent does no more than 'ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and
should act' . . . , [t]he deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to
discourage the officer from 'do [ing] his duty.' "276 Exclusion was therefore prac-
tically and normatively inappropriate.
Similar reasoning supports the law-of-the-officer approach. An officer who
is unaware that he or she may uncover evidence related to a crime in another
state (as in Orlosky and Evers) is not culpable. Applying the exclusionary rule in
such situations would do little more than "deter . .. conscientious police
work."2 7 7 The same is true, though to a lesser degree, of forum officers who pur-
sue an investigation in another state and of situs officers who perform a search
that is ultimately relevant to a criminal prosecution in another state. "Responsi-
ble law enforcement officers will take care to learn 'what is required of them'
under Fourth Amendment precedent,"2 78 as well as precedent interpreting their
state's Fourth Amendment analogue. When that "binding .. . precedent specifi-
cally authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained officers will and should
use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public-safety responsibilities."279
Applying a different state's law will often punish "nonculpable, innocent police
conduct" when officers reflexively follow the law that governs the vast majority
of their professional life. 28 0 Indeed, it is hard to argue that officers act with gross
negligence when they fully comply with their own state's constitutional law.
In sum, the law-of-the-officer approach maximizes deterrence, the primary
rationale animating state exclusionary rules. The approach encourages adher-
ence to the law of the officer's state by ensuring that, where possible, officers
receive consistent and simple behavioral signals that facilitate investment in
learning and compliance with the law. Equally important, the approach does not
273. Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984)).
274. Id. at 240 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).
275. Id. (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).
276. Id. at 241 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920).
277. Id. at 241.
278. Id. (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (20o6)).
279. Id.
28o. Id. at 240.
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unrealistically require officers to understand the intricacies of multiple states'
search-and-seizure law. 8 1 A rule or standard that purports to hold officers ac-
countable to another state's law would only risk sacrificing probative evidence in
exchange for little or no behavioral benefits. In fact, such a rule or standard
might even further delegitimize the exclusionary remedy. And finally, any other
rule or standard would punish responsible police practice and hence run counter
to the Supreme Court's culpability-based analysis in Davis.
b. Judicial Integrity and Public Trust
Though deterrence favors the law-of-the-officer approach, it is not neces-
sarily the only principle that guides the application of state exclusionary rules.
Some state courts have articulated additional values, most commonly judicial in-
tegrity and maintaining the public's trust in government.2 82 Neither provides
any reason to reject the law-of-the-officer approach.
281. Some might argue that in at least one other context-the law of arrest-police officers are
expected to know the law of another state. At common law, state officers' arrest authority
extended only as far as "the territorial jurisdictional limits of the law enforcement entity for
which the officer work[ed]." State v. Updegraff, 267 P.3 d 28, 42 (Mont. 2011); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948) ("[I]n absence of an applicable federal statute
the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its validity.");
Commonwealthv. Limone, 957 N.E.2d 225, 228-29 (Mass. 2011) (similar); Bostonv. Balt. Cty.
Police Dep't, 744 A.2d 1062, 1o65 (Md. 2000) (similar). And still today, arrests made outside
of an officer's jurisdiction must be justified as either falling within a common-law exception
to the general rule or as statutorily authorized by the state where the arrest was made. A num-
ber of courts, however, have carved out exceptions to this rule, suggesting that in certain sit-
uations it is not unreasonable to tolerate violations of situs law when forum officers operate
extra-jurisdictionally. See, e.g., People v. Galan, 893 N.E.2d 597, 616-17 (Ill. 2008); State v.
Dentler, 74 2N.W.2d 84, 90 (Iowa2007); State v. Ferrell, 356 N.W.2d 868, 871-72 (Neb. 1984);
State v. Bonds, 653 P.2d 1024, 1032 (Wash. 1982). For example, the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted similar reasoning to that advanced here when it excused an Illinois officer's failure to
comply with Indiana law because the arrest "complied with the [F] ourth [A] mendment, its
common-law antecedents, and Indiana statute." Galan, 893 N.E.2d at 617. In other words,
compliance with federal and forum law was sufficient.
Moreover, even assuming that arrests should always require compliance with situs law,
there is good reason to treat investigations differently. Perhaps policymakers believe that when
an individual's bodily liberty is at stake, requiring that police pay greater attention to a differ-
ent state's arrest law is an acceptable price to pay to protect in-state individuals. At the very
least, the fact that some courts and legislatures have required that out-of-state officers comply
with a given arrest state's law does not necessarily mean that they would also agree that out-
of-state officers should be required to know not just a different state's arrest law but also its
entire search-and-seizure doctrine.
282. LAFAVE, supra note 43, §§ 11(f), 1.5(c). Because this Note considers the appropriate approach
in the run of cases, it necessarily considers only the rationales articulated by the majority of
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The two rationales derive from language that the Supreme Court has used at
one time or another to characterize the federal exclusionary rule. The idea of ju-
dicial integrity, for example, is rooted in the Weeks decision, in which the Court
declared that "unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in the judgments of
the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution."2 83
According to this rationale, courts should refuse to admit unlawfully obtained
evidence lest they become accomplices in a constitutional violation.284 In the
words of Justice Holmes, it is "a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the Government should play an ignoble part."2 85 The Hawaii Supreme
Court has embraced the rationale and explained that " [t] he 'judicial integrity'
purpose of the exclusionary rule is essentially that the courts should not place
their imprimatur on evidence that was illegally obtained by allowing it to be ad-
mitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution."2 8 6
Advocates of the public-trust rationale, on the other hand, argue that to sanc-
tion "lawlessness by officers of the law" by admitting unlawfully obtained evi-
dence would "have [a] tragic effect upon public respect for our judiciary."287 In
other words, application of the exclusionary rule "assur [es] the people - all po-
tential victims of unlawful government conduct- that the government w [ill] not
the states. As a result, the few states that do recognize additional rationales may reject the
reasoning here as incomplete. They might argue, for instance, that this analysis gives insub-
stantial weight to the protection of individual privacy. Cf State v. Torres, 262 P.3d ioo6, 1o18
(Haw. 2011) (recognizing the protection of individual privacy as a purpose underlying Ha-
waii's exclusionary rule). As a threshold matter, few states maintain such additional purposes.
They would thus, at worst, constitute minor exceptions to the general rule articulated here.
But more importantly, even assuming these idiosyncratic factors cut against applying the law
of the officer, the law-of-the-officer approach could still be appropriate in these states due to
the weight of the deterrence rationale and the indeterminacy of any rationale that turns on a
perception that the judiciary is condoning lawlessness.
283. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin,
'A More Majestic Conception": The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary
Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 5o (2010).
284. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) ("[T]he federal courts [should not] be ac-
complices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold."); see also
Bloom & Fentin, supra note 283, at 5o.
285. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
286. Torres, 262 P.3d at 118 (quoting State v. Bridges, 925 P.2d 35 7 , 366 (Haw. 1996)); see also State
v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1328 (N.J. 1989) (implying that "judicial integrity is ... imperiled"
when there is a "misuse or perversion of judicial process").
287. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 46 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermin-
ing popular trust in government."2 88 Embracing this rationale, the Vermont Su-
preme Court has declared that its exclusionary rule serves, among other goals,
to "promote the public's trust in the judicial system."289
Both the judicial-integrity and public-trust rationales, however, turn on the
legality of a particular search -a fact determined by reference to the law that
governs the case. Only if a search was illegal can the judiciary be said to have
placed its imprimatur on illegality. Similarly, the government must have profited
from some lawless behavior for the public's trust to be compromised. But at the
conflict-of-laws stage, the court must determine what law to apply and thus
whether there was an unlawful search in the first place. Only after a governing
law is chosen can a particular action be deemed lawful or unlawful. Put differ-
ently, if a court were to adopt the law of a state that does not recognize a partic-
ular search as unconstitutional, it cannot be said to have condoned illegality be-
cause the alleged misconduct, according to that state's law, was never illegal.
Understanding the difference at the conflict-of-laws stage between the ana-
lytical weight of these rationales and the analytical weight of the deterrence ra-
tionale is important. Section IV.B.1 demonstrates that officers can only realisti-
cally be deterred from violating their own state's law, and the possibility of such
deterrence is maximized if courts follow the law-of-the-officer approach. But
while the application of only one law will allow exclusionary doctrine to have a
deterrent effect, the judicial-integrity and public-trust rationales are meaningless
at the conflict-of-laws stage. Applying one law over the other will not promote
judicial integrity because judicial integrity can only be compromised if a search
is held to be unlawful under one of the relevant states' search-and-seizure laws.
That is why the deterrence value alone provides guidance when courts are decid-
ing which law to apply.
2. Conflicts of Law Involving Multiple States' Officers
The above analysis resolves cases that involve cooperation among various
states' law-enforcement officers as long as only a single state's officers perform a
given search. A variation is required for cases in which more than one state's of-
ficers participate in the search.2 90 In those cases, a bright-line rule favoring the
situs officer is most appropriate.
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288. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289. State v. Lussier, 757 A.2d 1017, 1027 (Vt. 2000).
290. See, e.g., Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
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For the reasons discussed above, it is preferable to impose a bright-line rule
based on the identity of an involved officer in order to cabin judicial discretion
and structure police behavior.291 And the law of the situs officer, rather than the
forum officer, best comports with the values underlying the exclusionary rule.
First, the participation of situs officers should alert forum officers to the possi-
bility that a different law could apply, and should help ensure that the forum
officers can reasonably be expected to know the applicable law. After all, there
will be at least one officer on the scene who can reasonably be expected to un-
derstand situs law and convey that law to forum officers.29 2 Concerns about re-
quiring the officers to know fifty state-law regimes will therefore be minimized.
Second, the rule preserves the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule, at least
for the situs officers. Those officers will still be held fully accountable to their
own state's law.
That is not to say that this rule is without costs. There may be times, for
instance, when forum officers have no ability to obtain information from their
situs colleagues before performing a given search. The situs state's exclusionary
rule would nevertheless apply and might exclude evidence that forum officers
could not have known would be kept out. Unfortunately, this is an inevitable
consequence of a conflict-of-laws case involving multiple states' officers. Some
set of officers will have to be held accountable to a different state's law. The al-
ternative -holding each individual officer accountable to only her own state's
law-would not be administrable. Given the collaborative and often hectic na-
ture of some searches and seizures, it would be difficult to divide a continuous
search into distinct acts by individual officers. Moreover, simplicity and ease of
application remain important goals for the conflict-of-laws field.293
It is also true that the rule could permit some bad faith actors to game the
system. This concern appears to be particularly salient for a few courts and com-
mentators that have previously considered interstate search-and-seizure con-
flicts of law. Corr, for example, created an exception to his situs-law rule for sit-
uations in which forum officers intentionally wait for a defendant to leave the
state in order to take advantage of another state's law.294 And in other contexts,
291. See supra Section W.B.i.a.
292. Cf Corr, supra note 17, at 1234 (arguing for universal application of situs law in part because
"there will usually be someone on the scene who understands that law as well as any police
officer is likely to understand it").
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
294. Corr, supra note 17, at 1237-38.
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courts have suggested that they too are sensitive to the possibility of what Corr
refers to as "trickery by forum police."295
The law-of-the-officer approach ameliorates some of these concerns since
forum officers could not simply thwart their state's constitutional demands by
performing a particular search out of state. However, if an officer thought
enough about the situation, she could engage in some gamesmanship. An officer
might, for instance, know that a defendant was planning to visit an out-of-state
acquaintance and seek to search the defendant's automobile under the more per-
missive search-and-seizure law of the acquaintance's state. In that case, the of-
ficer could wait to perform the search and ask situs officers to perform it instead.
The law-of-the-officer approach would admittedly permit this conduct. But
bad-faith cases such as these are likely rare.29 6 And allowing this conduct in such
a narrow sliver of cases is an acceptable price to pay for the predictability and
transparency of the law-of-the-officer approach. Moreover, it should be remem-
bered that in all situations, a defendant at least benefits from his or her federal
constitutional rights. No matter the police gamesmanship, he or she is never left
without any search-and-seizure protection.
CONCLUSION
Current approaches to resolving interstate search-and-seizure conflicts of
law have proven inadequate. From resort to the substance-procedure distinction
to the exclusionary-rule approach, each is conceptually flawed in its own way.
This Note proposes a novel law-of-the-officer approach that has firmer theoret-
ical and practical footing.
Under the law-of-the-officer approach, courts should engage in a two-step
analysis. The first step requires interpreting the two potentially applicable con-
stitutional provisions. Only if both apply should the court proceed to the next
step and apply the law of the officer who performed the search. This is a simple
analysis when only one state's officers are involved: forum law will govern forum
295. Id. at 1238; see, e.g., People v. Galan, 893 N.E.2d 597, 620 (Ill. 2008) (allowing the admission
of evidence obtained after forum officers violated another state's arrest law but cautioning that
"law enforcement officials should not consider it a certainty that we will find the exclusionary
rule inappropriate under a different set of facts, particularly in situations involving willful
misconduct"); State v. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d 84, 90 (Iowa 2007) (offering a similar admoni-
tion).
296. The law-of-the-officer approach is designed to resolve conflicts involving state officers only.
The risk of gamesmanship is likely higher when state officers cooperate with federal officers
who operate within a state's borders. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Dirty Silver Platters: The
Enduring Challenge of Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IowA L. REv. 293 (2013)
(documenting and criticizing current and historic instances of federal-state cooperation de-
signed to evade state or federal laws).
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officers and situs law will govern situs officers. The analysis becomes slightly
more complex when more than one officer is involved in the search. In those
cases, the court should apply the law of the situs officer. This rules-based ap-
proach acknowledges that police officers are unlikely to know the intricacies of
fifty state-law regimes and refuses to sacrifice probative evidence when this re-
ality clashes with some theoretic ideal. Moreover, it serves the most common
exclusionary-rule value - deterrence - and is consistent with other common jus-
tifications for the rule.
To be sure, some courts may be unpersuaded. Perhaps they will believe that
the law-of-the-officer approach pays insufficient attention to issues such as in-
dividual privacy or other state-specific concerns. This Note argues only that this
analysis will appropriately resolve search-and-seizure conflicts of law in most ju-
risdictions. At the very least, it should be clear that the current approaches to this
problem are inadequate; greater attention to devising a conceptually sound
framework is needed. The law-of-the-officer approach provides a theoretically
satisfying and practically feasible solution.
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